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ABSTRACT 
South Africa has been considered a bastion of democracy on the continent of Africa since 
its first fully democratic election in 1994. Yet, under its second president since apartheid, Thabo 
Mbeki, the consolidation of South Africa’s democratic gains tended to slow or even stagnate. 
This thesis develops a theoretical backdrop by explaining competing theories of leadership 
and development in Africa. With Thabo Mbeki’s promotion of the African Renaissance he 
should be considered to of promoted a good governance model of growth and leadership within 
South Africa. To determine whether Mbeki actively followed through in implementing good 
governance practices as leader of South Africa and the ANC this thesis analyzes three aspects of 
the African National Congress (ANC): centralization, corruption and the 2007 leadership 
succession. Through this analysis of these three aspects of the ANC under Mbeki the thesis 
moves to determine whether the former president should be considered to have cultivated a good 
governance regime while in office or whether his leadership of South Africa embraced more 
neopatrimonial logic. 
This study finds that under Mbeki neopatrimonialism expanded significantly, particularly 
within the ruling ANC, and can to a certain extent be used to explained Mbeki’s actions while 
president of South Africa. Despite actively promoting a good governance agenda this thesis 
argues that Mbeki contributed to the stagnation of democratic gains in South Africa. This legacy 
will continue to effect future South African leaders including Mbeki’s arch-rival Jacob Zuma. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The history of post-independence Africa is often highlighted by the failure of 
democracy to take hold and consolidate. In a few countries on the continent democratic 
traditions have taken root and led to strong democratic institutions. Yet, many countries 
have witnessed spectacular failure with regards to democratic governance. This has led to 
considerable research on why wave after wave of democratization has failed to 
consolidate and produce strong democratic governments in Africa. 
South Africa has often been considered a model in Africa because of its strong 
democratic transition which followed the end of white rule and apartheid. Yet, even as 
South Africa has been touted as a model for good governance within Africa, the years 
since the introduction of democracy have seen stagnation in the country’s attempt to 
consolidate governance improvements. Despite the moral authority of the African 
National Congress (ANC), the leader in the fight for democracy, problems began to 
develop and much of the goodwill built up under Nelson Mandela was lost during the two 
terms of the second president, Thabo Mbeki. This has been attributed in part to his 
bizarre behavior and policy decisions regarding a variety of issues such as AIDS, 
Zimbabwe, and corruption. In consideration of these issues a broader concern could be 
raised about Mbeki’s leadership ability. Specifically, to what extent has South Africa 
improved, from a governance standpoint, if at all under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki? 
This thesis will analyze the initial years of South Africa’s democracy under the 
leadership of Thabo Mbeki and the ANC. The Mbeki years were an important period 
given the uncertainty of entering the post-Mandela era. Mbeki had been a strong 
proponent of good governance and most were confident given the moral authority the 
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ANC had built up that South Africa could weather the inevitable letdown after Mandela. 
Yet, significant issues arose during Mbeki’s time in office which led to problems. I argue 
in this thesis that, despite Mbeki’s proclamations of adhering to good governance, he did 
not follow through on those promises. Instead, I argue that Mbeki should be considered to 
have followed a more neopatrimonial model of leadership. 
Thabo Mbeki warrants analysis due to his important time as president of South 
Africa as well as the leadership he displayed within the broader African continent. Of 
specific interest is his call for an African Renaissance that urges for the rebirth of the 
African continent and for its people to rise up and realize their potential. The central 
aspect of Mbeki’s Renaissance is The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) plan which touts African solutions for Africa’s problems upon a framework of 
good governance. 
The importance of good governance in Africa has been discussed at length. The 
main argument for implementing good governance in Africa is its ability to spur 
development. There is a growing understanding that theories for development in 
developing nations can not simply ‘fix’ problems by focusing on singular issues such as 
economic growth. A growing view amongst academics, non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) and others is the overriding importance of politics for development.  
When African nations first gained independence from colonial powers during the 
1960’s it was thought that this would bring change to Africa. Often these events were 
hailed as the opportunity for African nations to take hold of their own destiny and pursue 
their own goals, separate from colonial powers. Since independence the continent has 
witnessed halting progress and in some cases regression in terms of development, 
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democracy, and peace despite numerous attempts to foster all three on the continent. Due 
to halting development, good governance has become an integral solution posited for 
developing African states.  
The growing importance of good governance in African nations is due to the 
economic and political growth it can facilitate. Growth in jobs, wealth and gross domestic 
product (GDP) all contribute to raising standards of living for Africans. Growth is often 
spurred on through foreign direct investment from multinational corporations along with 
crucial aid from developed countries. This has led to a growing market for good 
governance information. What has followed is the creation of governance indicators that 
rate levels of governance for investing companies and donor countries. There is such a 
market for understanding governance ratings that a number of organizations, such as the 
World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), among others, have begun to rate governance in the developing world through 
specific indicators. The interest stems from a growing desire by companies and countries 
to calculate governance ratings as it has become one of the most important factors when 
corporations or countries look to invest in developing economies.1 The OECD has 
outlined four additional reasons for the growing interest in governance. They included: 1) 
international investment has grown substantially; 2) the end of the Cold War; 3) failed 
policy reform, and 4) new intuitional economics.2 
Poor governance hinders positive growth and development on the African 
continent. The Blair Commission, a panel set up by former Prime Minister of Britain 
Tony Blair to develop solutions to problems of African development claims that 
                                                 
1  Christiane Arndt and Charles Oman, Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators, (OECD Publishing, 
2006), 9. 
2  ibid., 17-18. 
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“…without progress in governance, all other reforms will have limited impact.”3 There 
has been significant research to suggest that there is a definitive link between improved 
governance and better development, as seen in income per capita, child mortality, and 
illiteracy.4 The commission argued that if Africa does not improve its governance; 
reforms in trade, debt relief, and aid will only provide cosmetic changes to a dire 
situation.5  
Interest in good governance is growing within Africa as illustrated by two recent 
initiatives. The first is the founding of the African Leadership Council, which has 
produced a code of African leadership with twenty-three “commandments,” and the 
Mombasa Declaration which identifies improved leadership as the most viable path to 
good government.6 It specifically promotes good governance principles such as the rule 
of law, anti-corruption measures, and respect for human rights. The council is made up of 
African men of “…unusual personal probity and esteem and as accomplished proponents 
of good governance.”7 
The second development is the Mo Ibrahim Prize. The prize is a cash reward of $5 
million over 10 years and $200,000 annually after that given to a former African leader 
who demonstrates good African leadership.8 Mo Ibrahim, the founder of the prize, is a 
former businessman in Africa who recently sold his mobile communication company, 
Celtel. 
                                                 
3  Commission for Africa, The Commission for Africa: Our Common Interest, (London, UK: Penguin, 
2005), 135. 
4  ibid., 136. 
5  ibid., 136. 
6  Robert I. Rotberg, "Strengthening African Leadership," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2004). 
7  ibid. 
8  Anver Versi, "The Ibrahim Index on African Governance.(Africa's Top 100 Banks)," African Business, 
no. 336 (2007). 
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Both developments demonstrate a growing interest in good governance within 
Africa. Yet, despite the growing interest in good governance from African nations, aid 
donors, and NGOs there is considerable evidence that improvements are difficult to 
achieve and show minimal results at the grass roots level. Despite African countries 
adopting measures adhering to good governance principles, their democratic 
improvements tend to fall significantly short of their goals. Such is the case in South 
Africa under Mbeki where, despite strong signs of the promotion of good governance, 
progress has been slow. 
This thesis will delve into the question whether Mbeki has adopted and 
consolidated good governance practices. If he did not, the thesis will then discuss 
whether this was due to Mbeki following neopatrimonial model of leadership. In Chapter 
two, the thesis will review the history of development which has led to good governance 
becoming the latest formula to ‘fix’ Africa. Then, it will attempt to define good 
governance and outline the World Bank’s six indicators to develop a procedure of 
assessment to study South Africa and Mbeki. The second part of Chapter two focuses 
specifically on neopatrimonialism. Two different yet interrelated theories based upon 
neopatrimonialism will be discussed to explain leadership in the African context as well 
to help explain why African states seemingly fail to consolidate progress in good 
governance. Finally, Chapter two will discuss Mbeki’s promotion of good governance 
through NEPAD which will put Mbeki’s own adherence to good governance in its proper 
context. 
Chapter three consists of a case study of South Africa. Specifically, the chapter will 
focus upon Mbeki’s leadership of the ANC during his time as president. Narrowing the 
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focus to centralization, corruption, and the 2007 leadership succession the thesis will 
construct a comprehensive understanding on Mbeki’s tenure in office. 
Chapter four moves forward to use this case study of Mbeki to determine whether 
he followed good governance, as he himself insisted African leaders and nations must do 
under NEPAD. The first part of Chapter four will determine Mbeki’s success or failure to 
follow good governance practices by analyzing his performance in relation to the World 
Bank’s governance indicators. The second part of Chapter four will then look to the 
emergence of neopatrimonialism through theories presented by Bratton and van de Walle, 
and Chabal and Daloz. Chapter four will close with an in depth discussion on South 
Africa’s situation after Thabo Mbeki. 
Finally, in Chapter five, a brief analysis of a few ‘causes’ that have brought South 
Africa to its current situation will be reviewed. As well, there will be a short section on 
the future of South Africa based upon the conclusions of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO: COMPETING THEORIES 
 
Introduction 
 
It is not a difficult research assignment to find examples in Africa of ‘big men’ 
who, once coming to power, curbed opposition to their rule, rigged elections, and took 
control of media outlets, to list only a few offences against their populations and good 
governance. Examples range from the Banda dictatorship in Malawi to Daniel Arap-Moi 
in Kenya and Mobutu in Zaire. The list is seemingly endless of African leaders who have 
thrown any semblance of good governance and leadership away in favour of tyrannical 
rule and dictatorship. In this chapter the two ideals of leadership competing in Africa will 
be dissected to create a theoretical backdrop for a case study on Thabo Mbeki and the 
ANC. Both west-centric good governance models and African models, such as 
neopatrimonialism, will be analyzed with regards to their applicability to South Africa. 
The final section will discuss Thabo Mbeki’s commitment to good governance as seen in 
his commitment to the New Partnership for Africa’s renewal. 
Theories on Development 
 
History of development 
 
The endless examples of faltering governance and general inability to create stable 
political, economic, and social regimes in many African countries have led to a number 
of suggestions for reform in Africa. Goran Hyden provides a succinct history of these 
reforms by explaining that the realization that there is a connection between governance 
and development is a recent one; as it took analysts time to understand that development 
meant more than simply policy, but also politics. Initially, development was conceived of 
as best attained through expertise and capital transfers which emerged from the world’s 
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experience in Keynesian interventions in postwar Europe. Development was simply 
understood as a replication of Western experiences, just in a shorter time frame. This 
‘projects’ based philosophy was implemented throughout Africa during the independence 
era of the 1960’s.9 
Near the end of the 1960’s it became clear that ‘projects’ were simply not fulfilling 
their promise due to numerous unintended consequences. To counter their failure, a new 
philosophy of ‘programs’ emerged because, it was argued, a more “…concerted sectorial 
thrust…”10 was needed. Thus, integrated development programs became the latest trend 
in the 1970’s with governments expected to take a leadership role in development.11 
Unfortunately, by the end of the decade it was obvious that African governments were 
incapable of realizing their developmental goals due to extreme inefficiencies which 
made it unsustainable to continue development programs and projects. This became even 
more pronounced when the energy shocks hit Africa in the 1970’s.12 
Once again new strategies emerged to help facilitate development on the African 
continent. Consideration was given to creating specific policy conditions which could 
bring about economic renewal and development. The World Bank took the lead and 
created economic reform programs called Structural Adjustment Policies, aimed 
specifically to enhance the private sector of sub-Saharan African nations. These policies 
were to free up resources from the government for use by other actors to reduce large 
                                                 
9  Goran Hyden, "Governance and the Reconstitutuion of Political Order" In State, Conflict, and 
Democracy in Africa, ed. Richard A. Joseph (Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner, 1999.), 180. 
10  Hyden, Governance and the Reconstitutuion of Political Order, 181. 
11  ibid., 181. 
12  ibid., 181. 
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inefficiencies. The popularity of structural adjustment lasted through the 1980’s and 
90’s.13 
With the onset of the 1990’s it became clear that development, as Hyden explains, 
was not about only projects, programs and policies, but also about politics.14 For a long 
period of development research, politics and development were seen as separate areas of 
focus, but during the 1990’s many began to agree that politics conditioned development. 
Thus demands for governance reform became a common theme. Calls for the 
introduction of multiparty politics, respect for humans rights, accountability and 
transparency in government actions followed as did the hope that these measures would 
prompt quicker development.15 
Good Governance 
In the discussion on good governance, first governance itself must be defined. 
Goran Hyden has defined governance as follows: 
“…it refers to that aspect of politics that aims to formulate and manage the 
rules of the political arena in which state and civil society actors operate 
and interact to make authoritative decisions. In more operational terms, 
governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the 
exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules. Such rules 
translate into constitutions, laws, customs, administrative regulations, and 
international agreements, all of which in one way or the other provide the 
framework for the formulation and implementation of policy decisions.”16  
 
With governance defined as the rules for the political arena, the definition of good 
governance can be explained. For this paper, the United Nations (UN) economic 
commission on Africa definition of good governance will be used. It states that: 
                                                 
13  ibid., 181. 
14  ibid., 181. 
15  ibid., 182. 
16  ibid., 186. 
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“…a condition whereby a responsibility [is] acquired through election; 
appointment or delegation is discharged in an effective, transparent and 
accountable manner while bad governance is associated with maladministration 
in the discharge of responsibility. Good governance entails the existence of 
efficient and accountable institutions – executive, judicial, administrative, 
economic, corporate – and entrenched rules that promote development, protects 
human rights, respects the rule of law, and ensures that people are free to 
participate in, and be heard on, decisions that effect their lives.”17 
 
Good governance combines a number of aspects which, when fostered and 
developed, often produces economic stability, peace and security which help improve 
standards of living. Good governance is built upon themes such as accountability, 
responsibility, and transparency. This thesis will delve into those aspects to develop a 
framework for assessment which will be used to assess Thabo Mbeki’s rule and South 
Africa’s commitment to good governance.  
One of the preeminent indicators of governance comes from the World Bank 
Institute. The World Bank began compiling governance data in 1996, around the time 
structural adjustment policies began to lose support within development circles.  
Amongst organizations which collect information on governance, the World Bank 
Institute is one of the more prominent sources due to their formula derived from six 
aspects of governance.18 For this thesis, the World Bank’s six aspects of governance will 
be used as a framework of assessment in understanding Thabo Mbeki commitment to a 
good governance regime in South Africa.  Here are the six aggregate indicators of quality 
of governance from the World Bank Institute: 
 “Voice and Accountability: the extent to which a country’s citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and free media. 
                                                 
17  United Nations, “United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,” United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa, http://www.uneca.org/search.html. (accessed August 14, 2007). 
18  Arndt and Oman, Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators, 28. 
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 Political Stability and absence of violence: perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
 
 Government Effectiveness: the quality of the public services, the quality of 
the civil services, and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government commitment to such policies. 
 
 Regulatory Quality: the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
 
 Rule of Law: the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 
 Control of Corruption: the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests.”19 
 
Theses six indicators will be used as a base for an evaluation of Thabo Mbeki and the 
ANC’s performance in Chapters three and four. 
Good governance is based on the best practices of Western nations as it relates to 
modernization and development. Good governance theory implies therefore that Western 
development and modernization is the preeminent model for development economically 
and politically which, if replicated, can produce similar economic success witnessed in 
developed nations. This is vitally important to applying governance models to Africa 
because there is perpetual bewilderment on the part of western nations regarding Africa’s 
failure to embrace good governance and consequent failures in development. It is often 
the case then that the West advocates that if only good governance were embraced, 
development problems would be solved.  
                                                 
19 World Bank, “A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance. Governance Matters 2006: Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, 1996-2006. Annual Indicators and Underlying Data.” (Washington, D.C: World 
Bank, 2006). 2-3. 
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Neopatrimonialism 
In discussing the benefits of governance and understanding its Western origins, it is 
also important to understand leadership in the African context. In this thesis two 
interrelated theories will be discussed pertaining to leadership and development in Africa. 
The first, described by Bratton and van de Walle, is based upon neopatrimonialism. 
Neopatrimonialism is founded upon Max Weber’s explanation of patrimonial authority. 
Patrimonial political systems are built around a singular person who often rules based on 
personal stature and prestige.20 Members of a strongman’s group are connected solely on 
their affiliation to the big man. The ruler governs on a personalistic basis instead of 
relying on codified laws. In offering security and stability through favours and benefits to 
those loyal to him, members of the group become clients to the big man.21 
The patrimonial system can be expanded to the African state with only subtle 
modifications to the theory. Neopatrimonialism, as it is called, is rule embodied in one 
person. Even if a constitution is in place the president or big man still dominates the 
entire state structure, making him above the law. Most important to the system is the 
loyal and dependent relationships that permeate the entire system. The big man in 
association with his inner circle (cabinet ministers, etc.) use these particularistic and 
personalized relationships, that undermine effective state administration, to access state 
resources for patronage and clientalistic practices which provide support and order.22 The 
public sector becomes controlled by private interests as bureaucrats and politicians do not 
hold their jobs for public service so much as use their positions to attain wealth and 
                                                 
20  Michael Bratton and van de Walle, Nicolas., Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997.), 62. 
21  ibid., 61. 
22  ibid., 62. 
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status. Bratton and van de Walle acknowledge that neopatrimonialism can be found in all 
systems but in Africa it is the core feature of politics. Personal relationships are obviously 
present in all bureaucratic systems but for Africa they are the “…foundation and 
superstructure of political institutions in Africa.”23 
Within neo-patrimonial systems Bratton and van de Walle identify three institutions 
which provide “…operating codes for politics that are valued, recurring, and reproduced 
over time.”24 These three institutions are presidentialism, clientelism and state resources. 
Presidentialism refers to the concentration of power in the hands of one leader. This often 
leads to power being curbed in other political institutions. With power being 
personalized, the interaction of the big man, his inner circle, and their clientalistic 
networks constitute the central features of political life in Africa. Often times the big man 
promotes a cult of personality and an image as the paternal figure of the nation.25 
The results of presidentialism often are decidedly non-bureaucratic regimes, (but 
with a large bureaucratic structure) as decision and policy-making rest solely in the hands 
of the president with little input or influence emanating from the bureaucracy. Power is 
absolute in Africa and in neo-patrimonial regimes rulers rarely feel restrained by the law 
or other accountability structures. Despite the excessive power big men wield, Bratton 
and van de Walle argue that this “…does not mean that these rulers were omnipotent; 
typically the weak and ineffectual state apparatus responded to their orders fitfully, and 
the rulers were often constrained by the need to maintain balance across complex ethnic 
or clan divisions. Yet it does mean that rulers and their closest cronies were not bound by 
the dictates of the law and often tried to emasculate or eliminated formal institutional 
                                                 
23  ibid., 62. 
24  ibid., 63. 
25  ibid., 64. 
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checks on the executive.”26 Legislatures and the judiciary were limited in their roles as 
checks on executive power.  
The second institution Bratton and van de Walle identify in a neo-patrimonial 
system is clientelism. Big men rely extensively on dispensing political favours such as 
public sector jobs, government contracts, and projects which are used to maintain power. 
In return recipients (clients) provide political support for the big man (patron). By giving 
prebendal control over their public offices to clients, who then create their own support 
networks, political support can be provided to the big man during an election.27 As a 
result, big men often have incentive to intervene in their country’s economy as political 
power is wielded through the distribution of state resources to political cronies. Public 
monies become privatized and economic policy is taken over by the presidency because 
of the economic rents it can provide the political elite.28 
Finally, the last institution of neo-patrimonial regimes is state resources. Due to the 
fact that state resources are used to retain power and maintain clientelist networks, neo-
patrimonial regimes often struggle to develop. Without political legitimacy they rely on 
clientelism and force to maintain power. But as the state apparatus grows to include 
various patronage positions it becomes less responsive and more costly. Public money 
becomes tied to paying a bloated civil service instead of for development. Public 
infrastructure suffers, basic services can barely operate, and the state struggles to police 
its territory and borders.29 The redistribution of state resources creates an endemic fiscal 
crisis in the state as it consistently outspends resources. Economic activity slows as taxes 
                                                 
26  ibid., 65. 
27  ibid., 65. 
28  ibid., 66. 
29  ibid., 67. 
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are increased while simultaneously scaring investors away. Foreign aid eventually 
becomes the one constant income source for neo-patrimonial regimes.30 
From this point Bratton and van de Walle identify five modal regimes in which 
African states can roughly be identified according to their level of political competition 
and participation. In the interests of this study the two regimes that are pertinent to South 
Africa include settler oligarchy and the multiparty system.31 The settler oligarchy refers 
to those regimes which are not neo-patrimonial in their features and resembles more 
European bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Often a dominant settler racial group, using 
exclusive democracy and the law to deny rights to a majority racial group, control the 
state.32 South Africa under apartheid fell within this category. 
Bratton and Van de Walle argue, justifiably, that transitions from settler oligarchies 
follow a much different transition path to democracy than other regime modals. In settler 
oligarchies pacted transitions towards democracy between elites occur due to protracted 
stalemates which neither side can win.33 Bratton and Van de Walle conclude that because 
of the institutional legacy left by settler oligarchies, a possible connection between a 
pacted transition and multi-party democracy is probable. Furthermore with the 
institutionalization of political competition Bratton and Van de Walle propose that the 
prospects for open democracy are improved when transitioning from a settler oligarchy.34 
Multiparty systems enjoy healthy participation and competition. Though not 
concentrated on in Bratton and Van de Walle’s analysis, the authors comment on the 
                                                 
30  ibid., 68. 
31 The other three modal regimes include the plebiscitary one-party system, the military oligarchy, and the 
competitive one-party system. ibid., 81. 
32  ibid., 81. 
33  ibid., 178. 
34  ibid., 179. 
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prospects for democracy in multiparty systems. They note the democratic gains which 
saw a number of nations move towards multiparty systems seem to be slipping with the 
re-emergence of neopatrimonialism or hybrid ‘big man democracy.’35 Bratton and Van 
de Walle analyze the possibilities of reversal, survival, and consolidation. They concede 
that states which have transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy are backsliding 
but argue that a long-term view must be used when judging transitions fro
neopatrimonialism towards democracy and good governance. Drawing a distinction 
between short term survival and long term consolidation they admit the transition from 
authoritarianism is quick but liable to unchecked executive power which could overturn 
gains made. But for Bratton and van de Walle the longer a democracy survives the 
greater its chance for consolidation.
m 
                                                
36 
Bratton and van de Walle’s model focuses upon the transition from authoritarianism 
towards democracy. Indeed their prediction about settler oligarchy transitions proved 
accurate in South Africa’s case. Yet, their model may come up short for identifying what 
may happen in the years after authoritarianism. The idea of a transitional period itself 
may be problematic as Carothers argues that the transition paradigm may not be valid in 
today’s Africa.37 Bratton and van de Walle argue that a regime is progressing (moving 
away from neo-patrimonial rule) or retreating (embracing neo-patrimonial features). 
Bratton and van de Walle therefore, like Carothers argues, may not fully appreciate or 
properly assess what is happening in Africa.  
The second theory, which can shed light on the possible shortcomings with Bratton 
and van de Walle’s theory, is Chabal and Daloz’s political instrumentalization of 
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disorder. Chabal and Daloz also base their theory upon Weberian ideas of patrimonial 
power. To understand this concept the structure of the African state must be understood, 
especially how political representation is practiced. In a modern, developed state a 
process takes place in which political institutions eventually become independent and 
free from societal influence and political pressure.38 Most important to this is the 
eventual creation of an independent bureaucracy.  The creation or evolution of a modern
state is the end of patrimonialism with public and private sectors becoming operati
distinct.
 
onally 
                                                
39  Patrimonialism would recede because the lack of access to state resources 
would mean little funding for clientelistic networks. Chabal and Daloz point out that 
there are few African states that possess an independent bureaucracy, providing evidence 
that Africa is not institutionalized. Both theories are similar in this regard. 
Where Chabal and Daloz differ is that they argue that the neo-patrimonial model 
gives too much emphasis on the impact of colonialism, explaining that colonialism 
actually failed to implement a modern (emancipated) bureaucratic rule. Thus, prebendal 
norms continued after the end of colonialism and still exist today. Chabal and Daloz 
explain that weak institutionalization has little to do with the failure of the state to 
modernize (emancipate) but rather failure itself is a desired position for African leaders 
because the state’s “…usefulness is greatest when it is least institutionalized.”40 They 
argue that a loosely institutionalized state is best suited for patrimonial power. In turn 
there is little desire to implement good governance principles because “…the 
instrumentation of the prevailing political (dis)order is thus a disincentive to the 
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establishment of a more properly institutionalized state on the Weberian model. Why 
should African political elites dismantle a political system which serves them so well?”41 
Considering good governance and development is ideologically based on Western 
nations’ best practices, Chabal and Daloz consider it illogical to assume that African 
development would occur similar to the western experience when patrimonial rule is 
most logical for political elites and African citizens. Chabal and Daloz explain: 
“Hence, the notion that politicians, bureaucrats or military chiefs should 
be the servants of the state simply does not make sense. Their political 
obligations are, first and foremost, to their kith and kin, their clients, their 
communities, their regions, or even to their religion. All such patrons seek 
ideally to constitute themselves as “big men’, controlling as many 
networks as they can, But to succeed as a “Big Man’ demands resources; 
and the more extensive the network, the greater the need for the means of 
distribution. The legitimacy of the African political elites, such as it is, 
derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power 
rests. It is therefore imperative for them to exploit governmental resources 
for patrimonial purposes.”42 
 
Essentially Chabal and Daloz argue that without the full implementation of the 
bureaucratic state African nations never shed prebendal partrimonialism and this logic 
continues today. In the West, most hold that all states develop along a similar path but 
these notions, according to Chabal and Daloz, are false. African political elites act in a 
very logical way to satisfy their citizen base but defy western conceptions of 
development and democracy. Chabal and Daloz outline the use of corruption, reliance on 
foreign aid and the recycling of leaders to give evidence that Africa is not simply failing 
to transition and develop but rather it is following traditional norms within the logic of a 
modern state.  
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Neopatrimonialism offers a competing conception of leadership that differs 
significantly from that of good governance. That difference is based on the concept of 
political accountability. In Africa, political accountability is “…collective and extra-
institutional…”43 because it is based on particularistic links between big men (patrons) 
and their citizens (clients). The main feature that characterizes neopatrimonialism is the 
inclusion of patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions.44  
The African Renaissance 
When analyzing Mbeki’s commitment to good governance one can look no further 
than the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). But NEPAD does not 
represent the genesis of Mbeki’s desire to ‘rescue’ the continent of Africa. Rather 
NEPAD is the culmination of an idea Mbeki first presented while Deputy President to 
Nelson Mandela. During this time Mbeki became involved in foreign policy which led to 
his interest in continental renewal.45 The African Renaissance, as it was termed, was first 
discussed publicly by Mbeki in 1997 to an American audience at Chantilly, Virginia.46 In 
the address Mbeki first explained his vision for Africa, the problems, hopes, desires, and 
solutions to the major problems which have plagued the continent.47 The renaissance 
consisted of five areas of engagement with the African continent: cultural exchange, 
emancipation of women from patriarchy, mobilization of youth, and the broadening of 
democracy and sustainable economic development.48 In a later address Mbeki expanded 
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this vision to include establishing and maintaining systems of good governance; 
introducing economic policies that would attract investment, reduce the intrusiveness of 
the state in the economy, establish regional economic pacts, and improve education, 
healthcare, decent housing, clean water, and modern sanitation.49 
This idea of renaissance eventually developed into something more substantive. As 
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations broke down in Seattle in 1999 and later in 
2003 in Cancun, western leaders understood the need to, at the very least, consult 
developing nations in greater depth. Mbeki’s renaissance fit this requisite nicely. With an 
African leader promoting a plan that included strong market friendly solutions coupled 
with the need for investment from wealthy nations, the West was eager to approve and 
encourage such a plan. In the West, it was seen as more prudent to negotiate with 
moderates (such as Mbeki) then fear a total disruption of world trade due to highly unfair 
trade terms for developing economies.50 A renaissance based upon liberalization of 
markets, free trade, and liberal democratic institutions was exactly what the post-Cold 
War environment of market hegemony was ready to embrace. Mbeki’s renaissance fell 
into line with market orthodoxy pushed by organizations such as the World Bank, who 
themselves had wanted South Africa to emerge as the continental leader for economic 
liberalization.51 
The renaissance concept promoted African-led solutions to the lack of development 
on the continent. The renaissance dovetailed nicely with the South Africa’s experience in 
emerging from apartheid to form a stable democracy in a relatively bloodless fashion. It 
also fit well with Mbeki’s own domestic program he was implementing in South Africa at 
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the time.52 As Ian Taylor explains: “Mbeki sought to place South Africa at the forefront 
of solving Africa’s problems through his advocacy of the renaissance concept and active 
diplomacy. This culminated in the birth of NEPAD.”53 
       The NEPAD program, which became the core feature of the African Renaissance, is 
an amalgamation of two proposals; the Millennium Partnership for Africa Recovery 
Program, which Mbeki, Bouteflika (Algeria), and Obasanjo (Nigeria) backed and the 
Omega Plan for Africa touted by President Wade of Senegal.54 Taking a page from both 
plans in concert with Mbeki’s renaissance vision for an African solution to development, 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development was born. Under the tenuous guise of the 
African Union,55 NEPAD latched onto the ideals of the renaissance. Based upon the best 
practices in donor countries, such as Britain and Canada, it focused on good governance 
solutions and a ‘partnership’ with the developed world.56 Thus the creation of NEPAD 
can be seen as an endorsement by African leaders of the Washington consensus: open 
markets, partnership with the West, democracy and good governance; all as vehicles to 
development and growth. By analyzing, briefly the substance of NEPAD, with 
knowledge of Mbeki’s involvement in its genesis, it is clear that Mbeki endorsed good 
governance as a model of development. 
NEPAD, according to its own website, is a “vision and strategic framework for 
Africa’s renewal.”57 It arose from a mandate given to the five initiating heads of state 
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(Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa) by the Organization of African Unity 
to create a development plan for African in July 2001. NEPAD was needed to address the 
challenges on the African continent which vary from poverty to underdevelopment.58 
NEPAD’s stated objectives, principles, priorities and desired outcomes explain that good 
governance is the basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable development. It 
points out that democracy and good political, economic, and corporate governance must 
be enabled in order to achieve success in its priorities. As well, in analyzing the desired 
outcomes of NEPAD, the issue of governance is basic to success in these outcomes. The 
second outcome specifically points out that Africa must adopt and implement the 
principles of democracy, good governance, and human rights. Good governance is one of 
the most critical concepts in the NEPAD document. To a certain extent it is the most 
crucial aspect of the partnership because it is the principle on which NEPAD is based.59 
 
Conclusion 
NEPAD demonstrates Mbeki’s initial backing of good governance as a solution to 
South Africa and Africa’s development problems. NEPAD developed out of the Mbeki 
renaissance which he first outlined in the late 1990s. Once becoming president, Mbeki 
became one of the chief designers of the NEPAD project as South Africa was one of the 
founding nations tasked to create NEPAD. In each step of NEPAD’s development, Mbeki 
has been a strong supporter and the driving force of its inception.  
Until recently Mbeki had been considered a positive force for change on the African 
continent. As an apartheid state, South Africa had been a pariah in the international 
community. But it was the near bloodless transition to democratic rule that, along with a 
                                                 
58  ibid. 
59  ibid. 
 22
highly respected Nelson Mandela, bestowed upon South Africa instant moral credibility. 
This credibility was inherited by Mbeki once he secured office. Clearly, Mbeki embraced 
South Africa’s credibility and sought to expand this ideal throughout the continent. His 
renaissance was to capture South Africa’s wave of optimism and spread it throughout 
Africa. 
By the end of Mbeki’s term in office in 2008, questions had begun to surface over a 
number of issues. Internationally Mbeki endlessly pushed the African Renaissance, both 
in Africa and further abroad. His foreign policy was filled with visits to drum up support 
for NEPAD. Yet, at home in South Africa a different picture began to emerge about 
governance issues which did not necessarily mesh with the good governance model 
Mbeki touted in his foreign policy. In the next chapter issues surrounding the ANC and 
Mbeki will be explored to help understand whether Mbeki has followed through on his 
claims that good governance is the only path to development in Africa or whether he and 
South Africa are following more traditional African leadership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23
CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDY 
 
Introduction 
 
Thabo Mbeki was the head of the ANC from 1997 to 2007 and president of South 
Africa from 1999 to 2008. In that time he made an indelible mark upon South Africa 
through his leadership and direction. The ANC dominated elections during his time in 
power and there is no reason to believe that this dominance will fade any time soon. Thus 
the future of South Africa, for the time being, rests within the ANC. 
As discussed in Chapter two, Mbeki was a strong believer in good governance and 
promoted it as the best way to effect positive change and help bring development and 
growth to South Africa and the rest of the continent. This chapter will analyze Mbeki and 
the ANC on three relevant topics: internal democracy and centralization, corruption, and 
the 2007 leadership succession. An important test case will be developed to understand 
whether Mbeki followed a good governance model or not. Within the context of these 
three cases the neopatrimonial model is particularly salient.60 
Centralization of the ANC 
The inner workings of the ANC are of greatest importance for the vitality of South 
Africa’s democracy. The ANC’s electoral success is mostly due to its historical 
significance as a resistance movement against the previous apartheid regime. For the 
majority of citizens in the country it is simply the only viable option come election time. 
It is interesting therefore when one of the most famous, venerable, and important South 
Africans speaks out against a “sycophantic, obsequious conformity…” that developed 
under President Thabo Mbeki and the ANC.61 Those were the words of Archbishop 
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Desmond Tutu, an apartheid resistance hero and former head of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Tutu warned the ANC that “…unthinking, uncritical, kow-
towing party line toeing…is fatal to democracy…”62 Indeed, due to its electoral 
dominance the level of democratic, open discussion within the ANC reflects the level of 
openness in South Africa as a whole.  
When Thabo Mbeki took power in 1999 his desire was to make his mark on the 
ANC and ensure its electoral dominance for the future. He strove to modernize the party 
along the lines of the Third Way, a movement made popular by Britain’s Labour Party 
under Tony Blair.63 The Third Way is a political philosophy which embraces both the 
market and the role of the state in governance and the economy. This philosophical shift 
would expand the ANC’s appeal to a more business friendly audience. Mbeki realized 
that globalization was transforming the world economy and the option for the ANC to 
stick with its Marxist-based philosophy would be difficult to maintain. 64 The consequent 
shift from Marxist-liberation movement to pro-market democratic party sent shockwaves 
throughout the ANC. The two other members of the tripartite alliance, the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 
had been the stronghold for left-leaning ideology within the ANC. To undertake such a 
seismic shift in philosophy meant Mbeki had to establish control over the eclectic 
political mix of the ANC. The market friendly policy ushered in by this paradigm shift 
created difficulty for SACP and COSATU. In order to maintain the votes SACP and 
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COSATU brought to the ANC and still shift ideologies, Mbeki increasingly had to 
concentrate power and decision making in his office. 
The centralization of the ANC by all accounts increased notably under the 
leadership of Thabo Mbeki, although, top-down control of the organization is not foreign 
to the movement. During the apartheid era the ANC had an authoritarian leadership 
structure in order to keep its members and the party actions covert to avoid the Afrikaner 
regime. Mbeki seized upon this structure to strengthen his control over the direction of 
the party. Apartheid era strategies and rules, at one time used to keep the ANC safe, were 
used by Mbeki to control the direction of the ANC in the post-apartheid era. This meant 
loyalty trumped competence in many cases. Debate existed within the party, but rarely 
once the party line was established on an issue.65 
Policy decisions are a prime example of how the party heavyweights, almost all 
loyal to Mbeki, imposed their will from the center. Policy making has often caused the 
ANC to revert to a closed process reminiscent of its time underground when top-down 
decision making was essential for survival.66 Mbeki worked extremely hard to gain 
control of ANC policy-making by installing loyalists in key positions who adhered to his 
centrist agenda. Understanding the strong leftist influence within the alliance, policy 
decisions were removed from the general membership and given to hand-picked party 
insiders.67 Those loyal to Mbeki were placed not only in senior positions of the ANC, but 
also in government positions and parastatal organizations. Those who resisted Mbeki’s 
                                                 
65  The Economist, “From Revolution to Evolution,” April 8, 2006, 5. 
66  Jeffrey Herbst, "Mbeki's South Africa," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (Nov/Dec, 2005). 
67  Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC, 128. 
 26
policy direction were sidelined, making many top jobs inaccessible to those who did not 
see eye to eye ideologically with Mbeki.68 
The ANC is structured along the governmental structure of South Africa. A 
National Conference elects the National Executive Committee (NEC), the Provincial 
Conference elects the Provincial Executive Committee, the Regional Conference elects 
the Regional Executive Committee, and the Branch Bi-annual General Meeting elects the 
Branch Executive Committee.69 The National Conference is the absolute ruling and 
controlling institution of the ANC. The NEC, which is elected at the ANC National 
Conference, is the highest governing body within the ANC. It is charged with leading the 
party between National Conferences. Its role is to supervise and direct the ANC and its 
entities, including national, provincial, and local government caucuses. The president, 
deputy president, national chairperson, secretary-general, deputy secretary general and 
treasurer general all sit on the NEC. Additionally members from the Youth, Women’s, 
and Veteran’s Leagues are appointed to the NEC. The chairperson and secretary of each 
elected ANC Provincial executive and eighty additional members round out the NEC. 
The National Working Committee (NWC) is elected by the NEC soon after a 
National Conference. The NWC also includes the president, deputy president, national 
chairperson, secretary general, deputy secretary general and treasury general. The Youth 
League, Women’s League, and Veteran’s League all appoint one member. Additional 
members are elected from the NEC. The NWC conduct work for the NEC and ensure 
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provinces, regions, branches and other organs carry out the decisions of the ANC.70 The 
NEC also appoints the electoral commission and the National Financial Committee.  
The way in which the ANC has evolved since the inception of democracy in the 
mid-1990’s has meant membership in the NEC is voted most often based on loyalty to a 
particular presidential candidate. This has been most recently seen in the 2007 Policy 
Conference which pitted Jacob Zuma versus Thabo Mbeki. NEC candidates were voted 
for the most part based upon which leadership candidate they supported. This has meant 
the diminishing influence of Party conferences. Other than choosing a leader every ten 
years, the conferences do not allow its membership to affect real policy change. As 
William Gumede points out regarding party conferences: “…draft policies are prepared 
beforehand, candidates for office are presented to delegates by the leadership, and all that 
remains is for decisions to be rubberstamped.”71 
Officially within the ANC, between Party Conferences, policy is developed through 
party structures such as local branches or the NEC. From there, policy is transformed into 
legislation by parliament and implemented by the government.72 In reality, policy 
development is considerably more top down, involving the president and cabinet 
exclusively with the presidency holding a veto on all matters.73 Alliance partners in the 
ANC were often marginalized and Mbeki was dismissive of ideas emanating from 
outside the ANC’s own bureaucracy.74 As well, with the NEC made up of Mbeki 
loyalists, rarely did it act independently when forming policy. 
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The centralization and control of the ANC’s internal democracy also extended to its 
control of the lower ranks in the party. With its inflexibility on issues of politics and 
power the national party extended its control to its provincial and local counterparts.75 
This was most evident when party candidates for provincial premiership and local 
mayoralties were nominated by the central committee rather than by provincial and local 
branches.76 In fact, a number of provincial party structures have been dissolved and re-
formed by the national party due to disunity or discipline related issues, though others 
have suggested this was to eliminate grassroots movements critical of the president.77 
The national party has, in some situations, dismissed provincial premiers (regardless
popularity) when they were perceived to be challengers to party leadership.
 of 
                                                
78 
One particular example of the national party machinery sidelining potential 
leadership challengers was when ‘the plot’ was revealed. In 2001 Mbeki told police to 
investigate Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale, and Matthews Phosa because Mbeki 
suspected they were plotting to overthrow him. The accusations were completely 
unfounded but the incident did push the three out of politics at the time.79 All three were 
considered possible leadership candidates in the future, with Ramaphosa, in fact, 
regarded as Nelson Mandela’s first choice to succeed him before being pushed aside by 
Mbeki. 
Other party structures also have come under the control of the presidency. Party 
positions such as chairmen of executive and local councils are now appointed by the 
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national leadership and, for a time, Mbeki extended his control to the ANC Women’s and 
Youth leagues.80 Mbeki also controlled chief posts in the civil service81 and, to enforce 
and control his directives, employed his own spy network which was separate from the 
state intelligence network.82 
These reforms weakened the ANC and strengthened Mbeki. Local branches and 
national policy conferences, which had controlled and influenced policy for much of the 
ANC’s ninety-three years, lost considerable power to the center.83 In fact, by December 
2000 the number of party branches had fallen from 1500 to 365.84 Local branches had 
been a significant part of the party core for most of its history.  
Consultation with the lower ANC ranks became rare. Policy leaders rarely 
explained decisions, making ANC members important only during elections, when votes 
were needed.85 One example of this was the way in which NEPAD was constructed. 
Although many endorsed the idea of a program such as NEPAD, it was never developed 
along normal policy-making channels. In fact, few in the ANC were aware of the plan 
and still fewer were let in on its development, possibly due to Mbeki’s fear that it would 
be watered down.86 
The ANC’s centralization of power could also be witnessed in the control Mbeki 
and party leaders exerted over the party’s parliamentary wing. Key to accountability in 
Westminster systems such as South Africa’s is the role parliament plays in checking the 
executive. As Butler explains, in South Africa’s case the Westminster system, which 
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partially fuses the executive and legislature, does reduce conflict and encourages 
efficiency but in turn creates space for the executive to subordinate the legislature.87 The 
only way to avoid this pitfall is when the ruling party readily endorses and supports the 
oversight role of parliament. Problematic in South Africa is that the ANC possesses such 
dominant electoral control that it does not fear losing office, providing little incentive to 
support accountability measures. In fact, the 1994 caucus code of conduct bars ANC 
Members of Parliament (MP) from using parliament as a tool to undermine party policy 
decisions; a policy reinforced at the 1997 party conference.88 Despite this, ANC MPs 
were vocal in keeping the government in check early in the party’s tenure but by the end 
of Mbeki’s first term it was clear that he would not tolerate dissent.89 
South Africa uses a proportional representation system in which political parties 
present MP lists. Depending on the percentage of votes each party gets, each receives the 
corresponding number of seats. This has provided another centralizing tool for Mbeki to 
gain control of ANC parliamentarians. If an MP questioned the party they were easily 
struck from the party list, negating their chances to take office.90 Party discipline became 
so paramount in the ANC under Mbeki that he, or his followers, often sat in on caucus 
meetings to control debate, imposed parliamentary officers and committee chairs, and 
forced revised legislation through parliament without analysis.91  
Due to the control exerted by the presidency over parliamentarians, MPs rarely 
challenged the executive and parliamentary committees and withheld criticism for fear of 
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losing patronage.92 With no job security due to party lists, MPs fell short in their 
oversight roles. This gave Mbeki the ability to bypass parliament and make the ANC 
contingent in parliament look like they have “…reverted to the exile style of politics, 
based on secrecy and loyalty, instead of coming to grips with the new demands of 
transparency and public accountability, as required by the constitution.”93 
Corruption in the ANC 
In addition to the centralizing nature of Mbeki’s leadership there was also a 
noticeable increase in corruption within the ANC. Andrew Feinstein lamented that the 
ANC by 2007 was “…an organization that has lost its moral compass.”94 Feinstein, a 
former ANC MP who resigned over corruption within the ANC, explained that issues of 
corruption and centralization in the party lay at the feet of ANC leadership.  A growing 
number of scandals plagued the ANC due to the loss of accountability structures outlined 
above. Evidence of corruption was revealed from all areas and levels of the party. 
 Cellgate, oilgate, and travelgate are a trio of corruption scandals that beset the 
ANC under Mbeki. The cellgate scandal involved the awarding of the country’s third 
cellular license to a Saudi consortium in which an ANC minister intervened on behalf of 
the Saudi bid instead of less costly bids. Rumours arose that contributions by the Saudi’s 
to the ANC insured there would be no investigation into the matter.95 Oilgate involved 
questions around Imrune Management, which was alleged to have channeled R11 million 
of public money via the state oil company PetroSA to help the 2004 ANC election 
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campaign.96 An investigation into the deal was silenced by the ANC and was revealed 
only through the efforts of the media.97 Travelgate consisted of close to forty MPs from 
all parties misrepresenting travel expense accounts worth R17 million.98 Most MPs found 
guilty in the scandal resigned their seats yet senior ANC officials implicated, including 
some cabinet ministers, simply repaid the money and kept their positions.99 
The media has not escaped the growing climate of corruption fostered by the ANC. 
The media has often been praised for its strong oversight role in South Africa, but it has 
recently come under criticism due to a number of incidents. For example, South Africa’s 
public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), was found to be 
blacklisting analysts and journalists critical on Mbeki and the ANC.100 A commission 
investigating the broadcaster noted that Snuki Zikalala, SABC head of news, specifically 
enforced the blacklist.101 Yet, instead of a strong response to Zikalala, the ANC gave 
what amounted to a “…slap on the wrist…”102 which was widely condemned because it 
seemingly endorsed Zikalala’s censorship of those critical of the ANC. This reinforced a 
growing sentiment that the ANC actively manipulated the national broadcaster for its 
own ends.  
The independence of the private media also became the focus of scrutiny in South 
Africa. In November of 2007, Koni Media Holdings placed a bid for Johnnic 
Communications (Johncom), a leading media group in South Africa. Johncom owns 
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publications such as the Sunday Times and the Sowetan. The Sunday Times in recent 
years has become very critical of the ANC government so questions were raised about the 
bid when it was revealed Koni members happened to be close allies of then-President 
Thabo Mbeki.103 The government denied this was the case yet the situation, at the very 
least, brought a number of conflicts of interest into the open. To compound these 
conflicts of interest was the news that Koni actively sought funding for the deal from the 
Public Investment Corporation, a government owned and operated institution which 
controls employee pensions.104 
Corruption even became institutionalized through ANC policy initiatives under 
Thabo Mbeki. One initiative which highlighted this growing corruption was the ANC’s 
affirmative action plan BEE (Black Economic Empowerment). One of the defining 
characteristics of the ANC platform in the apartheid era was its socialist ideology and 
desire to nationalize major sectors of the economy in order to quickly redress the 
economic inequality created by apartheid. Yet, as it is well known, after the end of 
apartheid the ANC abandoned its Marxist economic policy and fully embraced the 
market economy. In order to de-racialize the economy within a market-context and help 
to combat income inequality in South Africa, the ANC moved to create a black 
bourgeoisie which “…would become the vanguard of black integration into the economic 
mainstream.”105 The BEE program was created as an instrument for blacks to use to enter 
the economy through funding from government within the framework of market 
principles. 
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BEE includes a number of strategies to develop a black entrepreneurial class: 
promotion of blacks to management positions, shifting equity ownership of South African 
companies from whites to blacks (enacted through government contracts which give 
distinct advantage to black owned companies), and government mandated industry-
specific racial targets, often set at 25% black ownership, through the end of 2010.106 
What is intriguing about BEE is its similarities to the methods undertaken by the 
apartheid National Party (NP) to improve the Afrikaner lot after the NP gained power in 
1948.107 
In Mbeki‘s 2003 state of the union address he explained his thoughts on BEE: 
“As we approach the end of the first decade of our new democracy the 
need for an economic transformation that brings about effective and 
significant black economic empowerment becomes more pressing. We 
believe that it is in the interests of all citizens that we succeed in this 
endeavor. Through a far-sighted partnership between all sectors of our 
society we can ensure a stable and growing economy that erases the 
inequities of the past and draws us all-irrespective of our race, sex or creed 
– into a more prosperous and equitable future.”108  
 
BEE was meant to develop a wealthy black class in the economic mainstream, engaging 
blacks in the greater South Africa economy as well as creating a trickle down effect that 
would de-racialize the country providing new work for blacks in the formerly white-
dominated economy. Furthermore, by assuring the protection of private property and not 
frightening away white capital the ANC could address economic inequality of blacks 
while reconciling South Africa economically much like the dramatic shift to democracy 
reconciled the country politically. Mbeki was a strident supporter of BEE, as Mark 
                                                 
106  Herbst, Mbeki's South Africa. 
107  Iheduru, Black Economic Power and Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 4. 
108  Thabo Mbeki, "State of the Nation Address 2003,” African National Congress, 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=ancdocs/history/mbeki/2003/tm0214.html (accessed September 5, 
2008). 
 35
Gevisser explains, understanding the importance of the black capitalist class as the 
forefront of democratic change. Mbeki felt it was important to nurture a black capitalist 
class and “…bring it into the ruling elite and to hold it there with a set of policies (BEE) 
and an ideological frame (Africanism) that resonated with its own aspirations.”109 
The legacy of apartheid demanded that the ANC do something to provide the means 
for the majority of poverty-stricken blacks to become involved in the economy. Despite 
tight economic management making the country attractive to foreign capital economic, 
growth alone would not decrease poverty and this is where BEE was to come in. 
Problematic for BEE’s stated goals was that there seems to be little evidence that it 
has worked to create a large black middle class and decrease poverty. A decade since 
democracy 10 percent of the population, mostly white, controlled 85 percent of the 
economy.110  Instead, BEE created a very small super-rich class of blacks who 
continually got ‘empowered’ with lucrative economic deals by virtue of their connection 
to the ruling ANC elite. This created an environment extremely conducive to corruption. 
In 2003 nearly sixty percent of BEE transactions that were negotiated and amounted 
to R23.3 billion, went to Tokyo Sexwale and Patrice Motsepe.111 Sexwale, the former 
ANC premier of Gauteng province, was able to secure 10 percent of an empowerment 
deal for a bank while only one percent was made available to workers.112 In another bank 
empowerment deal Cyril Ramaphosa and Saki Macozoma acquired nearly R1 billion 
($158.5 million) in equity from Standard Bank.113 Both were considerably wealthy at the 
time of the deal and continued to acquire more with little or no investment from 
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themselves.114 Ramaphosa and Macozoma, at the time of the deal, sat on the ANC’s 
National Executive Council.115 
Cyril Ramaphosa is often considered the poster child of BEE, and with good cause. 
He was the former Secretary-General for the National Union of Mine Workers and 
principal negotiator for the ANC in the transfer of power that ended apartheid. After 
leaving the ANC he became one of the richest men in South Africa.116 Iheduru notes that 
organized labour has been one of the most unlikely sectors to join in this accumulation 
effort, which, Iheduru mentions, tempers its militancy so labour would not hurt the 
system which has provided enrichment and wealth.117 
The steady parade of ANC politicians going into the corporate world has become 
alarming even to Mbeki, who championed BEE and certainly should have foreseen such 
consequences. ANC heavyweights such as Matthews Phosa (former ANC premier), 
Ramaphosa and Sexwale are some of the many who have taken advantage of 
empowerment. Questions surround the corruption that could take place because those 
empowered often contribute to the ANC. For example, Sexwale, in 2004, paid the entire 
salaries of the ANC head office staff, creating obvious conflicts of interest.118 Finally, in 
many sectors where BEE deals have taken place most blacks lack the skills needed in 
executive and management positions, thus most BEE businesses are still dominated by 
whites with blacks simply fronting them.119  
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BEE, though founded upon principles that can be generally accepted, created a 
system in which the general goal of creating a black middle class has not been realized.  
In fact, BEE has created other problems which may prove disastrous for good 
governance. BEE does not reduce income inequality between races because the unhealthy 
connection between the black business elite and government has reduced accessibility to 
empowerment for wider population. Additionally BEE could “… [limit] the new class’s 
independence from the ruling elites- an independence which, it is argued, is essential for 
consolidating democracy and bolstering a political opposition.”120 
One of the most interesting and controversial aspects of the BEE is the revelation of 
a network of companies named Chancellor House Group which was created to take 
advantage of black empowerment deals to fund the ANC.  Although its existence has 
been denied by some in government121 the Mail and Guardian, a South African weekly 
paper, revealed that Chancellor House was indeed a business front for the ANC122 with 
several high ranking ANC officials having direct ties to the company.123  
Chancellor House has a comprehensive portfolio that operates in minerals, energy, 
defence and the logistics sector that depend on state procurement or rights granted by the 
government. A number of deals have been revealed and offer a glimpse into a 
disconcerting relationship in which the ANC is both the regulator and beneficiary. A 
recent energy deal with Eskom (South Africa’s power corporation) and Chancellor House 
brought attention to the questionable nature of the company. In November 2007 it was 
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revealed that Hitachi Power Africa was awarded a R20 billion tender from Eskom to 
supply six steam generators for the Medupi coal station in Limpopo. Chancellor House 
has a 25% stake in Hitachi Power – or R3billion piece of the tender. In January 2008 the 
Hitachi group was awarded another contract, nicknamed Project Bravo, worth around 
R18.5 billion. The two contracts together put Chancellor House’s stake in Eskom’s 
expansion programme at R5.8 billion.124 
Eskom’s contracts with Chancellor House occurred simultaneously to the near 
calamitous collapse of power capacity in South Africa which has led to blackouts and 
load shedding, damaging the health of the economy. The mismanagement of coal 
stockpiles due to pro-BEE policies favoured new suppliers and incentives to use a 
hierarchical system of procurement caused Eskom to burn more coal than it bought.125 
Chancellor House’s entrance into Eskom, highlighted BEE’s potential to create conflicts 
of interest. In addition both power deals were concluded without adhering to standard 
procurement rules.126  
Another deal which was revealed in March 2007 was the development of a fertilizer 
plant in South Africa worth $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion (R11.1 – R18.5 billion). The deal 
involved Chancellor House and Standard Bank in South Africa and two entities from 
Russia – a state-run lender Venesheconombank and Azot Agrochemical Corporation.127 
Samantha Enslin of Business Report described the situation: 
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“There is no doubt that the deal between Vnesheconombank, the state 
owned Russian bank, and Chancellor House, the company that has been 
linked to ANC funding scams, will raise more than a few eyebrows. 
This is not surprising, given that the relationship between government and 
business is already too close for comfort and the general perception that 
companies with strong links to the ruling party tend to get the first bit of 
any new business.”128 
 
 
Corruption was also rampant at senior levels of the ANC under Mbeki. Jackie 
Selebi, the former head of police in South Africa and close confidant of Mbeki, was 
charged with corruption and defeating the ends of justice.129 The charges against Selebi, 
who as police commissioner often downplayed South Africa’s devastating crime 
problem, also included fraud, money-laundering, and racketeering which stem mostly 
from his ties to Glenn Agliotti.  
Agliotti, a convicted drug smuggler, was connected to the death of mining magnate 
Brett Kebble in 2005.130 Kebble, who was previously alleged to have influenced a 
number of high-profile ANC members, had seen his mining empire begin to collapse 
when he was murdered. Agliotti was later charged with the murder of Kebble which was 
problematic for Selebi who admitted that he is a close friend of Agliotti’s.131 The charges 
against Selebi revealed that he had a ‘generally corrupt’ relationship with Agliotti in 
which he accepted money from Algiotti amounting to R1.2 million between 2000-
2005.132 
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What is more peculiar and in fact more corrupt is the extent to which it seems 
Mbeki tried to protect Selebi. In September of 2007 two arrest warrants for Selebi were 
cancelled inexplicably and soon after Vusi Pikoli, the national prosecutor investigating 
Selebi, was suspended by Mbeki for an unexplained breakdown in Pikoli’s relationship 
with the justice minister.133 Gerrie Nel of the special investigations unit of the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA), also known as the Scorpions, had also been involved in the 
arrest warrants and continued to investigate Selebi after Pikoli was removed and was 
preparing to charge Selebi again.134 In January 2008, just as Nel prepared to charge 
Selebi, he was arrested on charges of corruption by the South African Police Force. Nel’s 
charges were quickly dropped raising further questions about why he was arrested. Selebi 
was later charged and Mbeki was forced to place him on leave. With evidence suggesting 
Mbeki knew of Selebi’s charges and attempted to protect him there was a sense of 
corruption and conflict of interest surrounding Mbeki’s actions in the matter.135 
Questions surround the case because it highlighted a growing problem regarding 
South Africa’s crime battle. The Scorpions have been successful in battling corruption, 
yet a turf war had developed between them and the South African Police Force (SAPS). 
With the arrest of Nel, it seemed Selebi’s force was exerting revenge on the Scorpions. 
Calls for the Scorpions to be folded into the regular police force have been strong from 
inside the ANC.  
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The call for the Scorpions to be folded into the regular police force came most 
fervently from the former deputy president Jacob Zuma and those loyal to him in the 
ANC. Zuma and his supporters claimed that the Scorpions and its superiors in the NPA 
were singling out Zuma on his own corruption charges. Some argued that the Scorpions 
unfairly targeted Zuma at the behest of Mbeki in order to gain the upper hand in the 2007 
succession battle for the ANC. Corruption allegations against Zuma connect to the 
highest profile corruption scandal to hit South Africa since the end of apartheid, an arms 
deal involving a number of high-profile ANC members. The scandal is centered around 
an arms deal between South Africa and a number of European arms companies, including 
BAe Systems, totaling R50 billion. 
The scandal was first revealed in a 1998 Auditor-General report which found 
numerous problems with its procurement process and noted numerous conflicts of 
interests amongst key decision makers in the deal, namely the Director of Procurement in 
the Defence Force, Chippy Shaik. Shaik was found to have favoured his brother Schabir 
in numerous deals. Former Defence Minister Joe Modise also possibly benefited 
financially from the deal.136 The report outlined problems related to the contract awarded 
to BAe/SAAB for fighter and training jets, which was the most expensive contract 
awarded.137 It was revealed that Aeromacchi, an Italian company, lost out to BAe/SAAB 
despite the fact its product was technically equal to Aeromacchi’s and Aeromacchi’s bid 
came to half the cost of BAe/SAAB.138 
The report also questioned contracts given to a German Frigate Consortium and a 
sub-contract to a French company. In the latter case, there was a cheaper local tender who 
                                                 
136  Feinstein, After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the ANC, 158. 
137  ibid., 158. 
138  ibid., 158. 
 42
did not get the naval contract.139 Issue was also taken with offset guarantees and 
disregard for staff requirements to operate the systems bought; and the final cost of the 
total deal may have been more then what was revealed by the government.140 
When the Auditor-general’s report was revealed, investigations into the deal were led 
by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa). The ANC spokesmen on Scopa, 
Andrew Feinstein, explained that initially the ANC leadership supported the investigation 
but this support quickly fell away. Feinstein explained that he was first pressured by then 
party whip Tony Yengeni to tone down the inquiry by not making it public.141 Soon after, 
high ranking members of the ANC began discouraging Scopa from investigating the deal. 
 Eventually Feinstein was replaced by the ANC as its ranking member on Scopa so as to 
end any investigation that would reflect poorly on the ANC. Feinstein later resigned his 
seat in parliament in protest of the ANC losing its moral authority. There is evidence of 
cover-up, intimidation, and corruption surrounding the ANC’s handling of the arms deal 
and the subsequent inquiry by Scopa, whose final report stated that no irregularities were 
found in the deal. With Feinstein no longer a part of the investigation the new ANC 
contingent ensured the inquiry found no fault in the deal. 
At the time of writing, numerous allegations have begun to surface anew over the 
extent of corruption associated with the arms deal including the involvement of ANC 
heavyweights in the deal. Joe Modise, defence minister and former head of Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (MK, the ANC armed wing), along with Mbeki took leadership in securing the 
R50 billion arms deal. It has been discovered that during the bidding BAe donated R5 
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million to the MK Veteran Association, of which Modise was life president.142 Another 
bidder who was successful bought Modise millions of shares in a defence company 
named Conlog, which stood to benefit from subcontracts through the winning bidder. 
Modise became Conlog’s chair weeks after leaving office.143 In total it is alleged that 
Modise received between R10-R35 million in cash bribes from various bidders.144 
It was not only Modise who benefited financially in the arms deal. Other 
government and ANC officials have allegedly received millions in bribes. Tony Yengeni, 
the former Chief Whip in the ANC, was charged for accepting vehicles from arms 
bidders. As well there is speculation that the ANC itself received millions from bidders 
who won contracts and this money was probably used for the 1999 election campaign.145 
Britain’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has also revealed evidence of corruption in 
the BAe deal with South Africa. In January 2007, the SFO uncovered evidence that South 
African agents received nearly ₤70 million between 2000 and 2005 through Red 
Diamond, a front company used for commission transactions, and ₤10 million through 
HQ Marketing, a secretive unit within BAe.146 One of the companies that received these 
payments was Hlongwane Consulting, which was started in 1999 by Fana Hlongwane, a 
close advisor to Modise at the time.147 
By the end of 2007, German prosecutors also looking into the deal confirmed that 
Tony Georgiadis helped channel millions in arms deal bribes to South African ministers 
and officials. What is particularly interesting about these allegations is the fact that 
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Georgiadis was considered a close friend of Thabo Mbeki. Reportedly Georgiadis 
influenced Mbeki while he was a lobbyist for a German arms interest during the 
acquisitions process. Mbeki had been the Chair of the Cabinet subcommittee that 
managed the arms acquisition.148 
As more evidence is revealed it has become clear that despite Mbeki and the ANC 
claims of no corruption in the arms deal, evidence has revealed corruption right through 
to the top of the ANC. Feinstein argues that in the end the Presidency was responsible for 
ending any investigation and pressuring the auditor-general to change the report 
critiquing the deal.149 The presidency was also involved in smothering all investigations 
by the national director of public prosecutions because of the ANC’s possible acceptance 
of bribes to fund its election campaign.150 
Connected to the arms deal is the role of Schabir Shaik, who was charged with 
corruption and fraud because of his relationship with his brother Chippy in the arms 
scandal. Not only was Shaik involved in deals which his brother Chippy oversaw, but his 
trial also revealed a very close relationship with Jacob Zuma, for whom he acted as 
financial advisor. In Schabir’s trial most evidence against him centered on his 
‘generosity’ towards Zuma, which amounted to nearly R1 million. It is alleged Zuma lent 
his name and influence for cash to help Schabir’s business dealings.151 
As a result of Shaik’s trial, Zuma was later charged with corruption leading to his 
firing by Mbeki as deputy president. Although the case collapsed on a technicality, it did 
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create a large rift in the ANC, pitting supporters of Mbeki against those of Zuma. Many 
in Zuma’s camp have declared that Mbeki purposefully used the corruption trial to 
sideline Zuma, reducing his threat to Mbeki’s leadership.152 
Furthermore, in late 2005 and early 2006 Zuma was put on trial for rape. These 
charges also fell through but it did reveal questionable behavior on Zuma’s part, 
particularly testimony that the woman was HIV positive and had looked upon Zuma as a 
father figure.153 Most troubling though is that Zuma was head of a moral regeneration 
campaign and head of the presidential task team on HIV/Aids. 
In early January 2008 Zuma was charged again for corruption stemming back to his 
relationship with Shaik. The new dynamic to this situation was the fact that Zuma now 
led the ANC. His supporters have claimed that the charges were simply another attempt 
by Mbeki to bring down Zuma during their battle for leadership of the party. This brings 
the thesis to the final area of analysis on the ANC, the succession battle. 
2007 ANC Leadership Succession 
The succession battle in the ANC has been one of the most disruptive incidents in 
South Africa’s young democracy. It highlighted the frustration over Mbeki’s policies as 
president which created a groundswell of discontent within the rank and file of the ANC, 
and to a certain extent the rest of the country. The succession battle for the leadership of 
the ANC took place on December 16-20 2007 at Poklowane during the party’s national 
conference. What made this succession so much different from past leadership choices 
was that, for the first time in decades, the ANC would have to choose a leader rather then 
simply crown an heir apparent. The last three presidents of the ANC had all stood 
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unopposed. Oliver Tambo won the job due to the inability of the ANC to hold an election 
during the apartheid years. Nelson Mandela was an obvious choice, and Mbeki too went 
unopposed, though much backroom maneuvering took place to ensure no challengers 
arose to face him.154 
The 2007 leadership race came down to two candidates, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob 
Zuma. Although in the lead up to the vote many tried to put forward a compromise 
candidate, due to the ANC’s aversion to politicking and lobbying for personal gain, no 
one emerged despite a wealth of talented leaders in the fold.155 As the party fractured into 
two sides, backing Mbeki or Zuma respectively, the chances of another candidate, such as 
Cyril Ramaphosa or Tokyo Sexwale became remote. 
Mbeki, as previously discussed, came under considerable criticism during his term 
as president. His centralizing control of the ANC created an open revolt within the party. 
His contempt for the rank and file members, his distant, aloof and intellectual style, 
business-friendly policies, and failure to improve service delivery or mitigate rampant 
crime and poverty angered party members. As well, his handling of corruption, 
specifically his glacial pace in dealing with ANC members embroiled in corruption as 
opposed to his swift moves to sideline Zuma, also angered the party. At the national level 
Mbeki upset many over his questionable views on AIDS, inferring there is no connection 
between HIV and AIDS, and his policy of quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe. 
Zuma, on the other hand, marketed himself as Mbeki’s polar opposite. Not formally 
educated like Mbeki, Zuma appealed to the rank and file, those Mbeki seemingly 
shunned. Many in the ANC, especially the leftist contingent (Cosatu/SACP), identified 
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with Zuma’s rise from poverty to the leadership of the ANC.156 Zuma’s appeal is populist 
in nature; he promised to redress the poverty issues many claim Mbeki ignored. But 
Zuma was also careful to appease the business- sector by stating that his economic policy 
would not differ from Mbeki’s.157 
Controversy at the party conference developed over the fact that Zuma was still 
mired in corruption allegations and that Mbeki’s term of office was to end in 2009. 
Constitutionally Mbeki had to step down as president of South Africa, yet he desired to 
continue as ANC president for a third term. Most argued that by staying on he could 
control who the next president would be and maintain significant influence over the party 
to ensure his legacy. What is abundantly clear is that Mbeki did not want to see Zuma 
become president.158 
The lead up to the Poklowane Conference revealed serious divisions within the 
ANC. Indeed, the infighting and factionalism created by an open leadership race was 
quite foreign to the ANC and the party seemed ill-prepared to handle it. The ANC had 
always kept all internal conflict under tight control and it is exactly its closed nature, a 
leftover from exile days, which left the party confused and troubled when faced with 
open debate and adversarial politics.159  
By the time of the conference, Zuma was almost assured victory, and indeed won 
overwhelmingly. With Zuma trouncing Mbeki the country was left with an unclear 
future. Mbeki was left a lame-duck president who was no longer in control of his own 
party. Zuma was soon after charged again with corruption, leaving the party’s leadership 
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situation very uncertain. Added to this is the fact that many in the Zuma camp, including 
Zuma himself, felt Mbeki was mobilizing state resources to discredit him. Looking at 
how slow Mbeki was to deal with other corruption incidents such as the Selebi incident 
their claims seem justified. 
The leadership conference created two centers of power in the ANC. Mbeki 
supporters, though, lost much control over the party’s central machinery, especially in the 
NEC. Mbeki’s polices on the economy and control over the party, which fostered his 
unpopularity, caught up with him and his desire to ensure his legacy was now out of his 
hands. Zuma, on the other hand, continually said the right things politically in areas of 
Mbeki’s greatest failures such as on corruption and centralization in the ANC. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the three facets of the ANC in this chapter develops an interesting 
picture of the party and Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki’s vision of what the ANC should be, given 
the goals and values of the African Renaissance, led him to remake the party. 
Understanding the diverse views within the party, Mbeki knew for his vision to be 
realized, control over the party would be essential. Thus we see the centralization and 
curbing of internal democracy within the party. This created space for corruption to 
develop. Placing the leadership of the party in the hands of a few loyalists with little in 
the way of accountability left the party susceptible. Corruption and centralization also 
created an unsettled atmosphere around the leadership succession in 2007. Anger over 
Mbeki’s leadership style and ideology developed into full revolt against his policies and 
led to the accession of Zuma as party president. Due to Mbeki’s penchant for sidelining 
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opponents, no strong candidates other than Zuma, a man charged with corruption, 
emerged. 
The next chapter will consider the ANC’s performance as it relates to good 
governance in order to analyze Thabo Mbeki’s term in office. Chapter four will discuss 
whether Mbeki’s leadership can be considered in line with good governance or if it falls 
into more African conceptions of leadership. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
 
The headline of the July 16 2008 Mail and Guardian newspaper read “Has South 
Africa betrayed Mandela’s legacy?” in reflection of the post-Mandela era as the former 
president celebrated his 90th birthday.160 South Africa, as it moved closer to voting in its 
third election since the apartheid era, was in the process of answering such a question. 
Nelson Mandela was lauded as a great African leader because he brought democracy to 
South Africa peacefully through forgiveness and reconciliation of his apartheid 
oppressors. His commitment to the democratic process separated him from other African 
leaders, seen most strikingly in his decision to step down from office after only one term. 
Yet, as Mark Gevisser explains, Mandela “…was a far better liberator and nation-builder 
than he was a governor. In contrast, [Thabo] Mbeki marketed himself as the technocratic, 
truth-telling antidote to the madness and the magic – the scattershot celebrity – of the 
Mandela era.”161 Mandela is often credited with bringing democracy to the country but it 
was Mbeki who had the task of implementing democratic governance as Mandela’s 
deputy.  
Mandela’s legacy towered over that of Mbeki who took over government in 1999. 
Gevisser explains Mbeki’s attitude towards Mandela and the celebrity that surrounded 
him: 
 “What seemed to irritate Mbeki most about the discourse of Mandela 
exceptionalism from the beginning, is that it cast Mandela as the great 
democrat and himself as the ‘tyrant-in-waiting’, whereas he often 
experienced the reality as the opposite: he was the modernizer who 
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believed in the supremacy of the rule of law; he worked always within the 
rules of democracy, sometimes having to rein in the somewhat autocratic 
tendencies of his superior, who ruled with more than a little imperial 
caprice.”162  
 
Mbeki felt that this Mandela exceptionalism fostered the idea that black African leaders 
not named Mandela could never rule competently. Mbeki often felt this was an indication 
that many perceived that he too could not rule proficiently.163  Thus, when the question of 
tarnishing Mandela’s legacy is posed, for Mbeki, it is an accusation loaded with racial 
overtones denigrating his ability to govern. If Mandela was less a governor and more a 
reconciler whereas Mbeki was the true democrat who held closely the tenets of good 
governance how is Mbeki’s term in office measured and does it indeed let down 
Mandela’s legacy? 
Chapter Four will dissect the evidence presented in Chapter three and evaluate it as 
it compares with the tenets of good governance. Using the World Bank’s governance 
indicators and the NEPAD country assessment of South Africa to assess the ANC record, 
it will reveal that Mbeki has not followed through on his endorsement of good 
governance. In the second half of Chapter Four the reasons why good governance has not 
taken hold will be discussed through an analysis of neopatrimonialism in South Africa.   
Good Governance in South Africa 
The UNECA declaration on good governance explains that those charged with 
leading a government must do so in an effective, transparent, and accountable manner. As 
the World Bank points out, even a small improvement in governance by one standard 
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deviation can induce a threefold rise in income in the long run.164 There are questions 
though about the applicability of good governance as it is defined by the UN, World 
Bank, and other organizations to Africa. As it has been discussed previously, good 
governance is based on the best practices of the West which inevitably leads to a west-
centric interpretation of good government. This subjective interpretation of the 
supremacy of western good governance model raises questions over the applicability and 
compatibility in African situations particularly when African power relationships do not 
operate the same as they do in the West. 
The first World Bank governance indicator is voice and accountability which 
includes the ability for citizens to choose their government, freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. In looking at the World Bank data on voice and 
accountability in South Africa there is a slight downward trend from just above the 70th 
percentile in 1996 to below the 70th in 2002.165 By 2006 the World Bank ranked South 
Africa at the 67.3 percentile.166 The World Bank has tracked South Africa on a 
downward trend from 1996 to 2006.  
                                                
The signs which indicate a weakening of voice and accountability are most evident 
within the ANC. ANC policy under Mbeki became increasingly controlled from the 
centre. Under Mbeki policy and debate were tightly managed by the presidency 
undermining internal accountability. With the ANC poised to retain electoral control for 
the foreseeable future, the lack of accountability within the party highlights a concerning 
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trend regarding voice and accountability in South Africa. Specific issues such as party 
electoral lists create problems of voice and accountability in parliament. NEPAD’s 
country assessment of South Africa echoes this sentiment by focusing on proportional 
representation (PR) in that country. The assessment notes that PR is necessary to 
institutionalize representative pluralist democracy because it ensures small parties and 
groups have representation. Yet the assessment warns that PR’s main challenge is “…the 
manner in which MP’s maintain links with the electorate. Because the MPs are elected 
through a closed list, their election is dependent on the party bosses. MPs are therefore 
beholden to the Party and its hierarchy rather than to constituents who elected them. This 
raises the issue of accountability.”167  
Another accountability issue in parliament is floor-crossing in South Africa. 
NEPAD’s country review notes that stakeholders and opposition parties in South Africa 
have expressed concern that floor-crossing could potentially harm democracy and good 
governance in South Africa.168 The fourth amendment of the Constitution allows for two 
15-day periods in each five year term for MP’s to change parties. The effect of allowing 
this in a PR system is that the already troublesome connection between MP and people is 
further weakened. Notably and unsurprisingly, the ANC has benefited the most from 
floor-crossing. As Mattes notes “Apart from the naked political opportunism exhibited by 
these events, the ANC has yet to explain how it can allow members to switch parties and 
still observe the constitutional requirement that election results must result in 
proportional representation.169 
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With regards to freedom of expression there has been a noticeable repression and 
stifling of divergent views within the party. Mbeki sought to sideline those who 
expressed different or opposing views on anything pertaining to his leadership. One 
incident in the party that reflected this was Mbeki’s firing of deputy health minister 
Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge for attending an AIDS conference in Spain without 
permission. Critics have pointed out that Madlala-Routledge, who revitalized the ANC’s 
approach to AIDS, may have actually been fired due to her criticism of the ANC’s poor 
job in tackling the AIDS epidemic.170 Mbeki’s view on AIDS has long been a source of 
bewilderment; his questioning of the disease most likely led to the government’s slow 
response to the virus which has allowed the pandemic to proliferate. Additionally, the 
ANC has tended to base authority on collective decision making derived from its central 
structures, such as the NEC or NWC. Thus, the promotion of individual success and ideas 
ahead of the party line is heavily discouraged.171 Mbeki often used this ANC tradition, a 
relic from its resistance past, to silence critics and stifle them on the grounds that 
individual criticism will cause factionalism in the party.172 
Under Mbeki the ability of the ANC member to have any say in who leads the party 
diminished drastically. Election to the NEC became controlled and managed while debate 
over his leadership was off limits. This may have lent stability to policy decisions but 
limited the membership’s ability to influence policy. Since 1997 the ANC political elite 
has continually exerted more control over the rank and file membership. A 2002 NWC 
document written for the 2002 Party Conference highlights this well. The document 
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explained that competing for positions in the party was to strive for individual gain over 
the party; therefore competition for leadership positions should be regulated and 
controlled. The document stated that members should look to ANC leadership for 
direction on whom to choose for leadership. This highlights why so often under Mbeki, 
incumbent positions for the NEC were elected unopposed.173 
Freedom of the media during Mbeki’s term in office was also closely monitored. 
The media in South Africa is amongst the strongest and most vibrant on the continent yet 
suspicion over the public broadcaster acting as an agent for the ANC and Mbeki led to 
considerable concern. As well, the consolidation of media ownership and its close ties to 
the former president created conflicts of interest in the media. As mentioned in Chapter 
three these incidences that challenge the integrity and freedom of the press harm the 
image of independent media. 
The second World Bank governance indicator is political stability and absence of 
violence. In this area of governance South Africa has undeniably made great progress 
since 1994. The World Bank’s figures reveal the same story. In 1996 South Africa ranked 
close to the 15th percentile, by 2002 it was over the 30th percentile.174 As of 2006 South 
Africa was ranked in the 44.2 percentile.175  
The ANC has done much to improve South Africa since the end of apartheid and is 
due much credit. Yet, at the time of writing the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe over Robert 
Mugabe leadership has forced millions of Zimbabwean nationals into South Africa. In 
townships around Johannesburg and Pretoria in May 2008 thousands of Zimbabwean 
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nationals living in South Africa were the target of violence and murder by South 
Africans.176 The violence was due mostly to a feeling amongst South Africans that 
foreigners have been taking jobs and generating much of South Africa’s crime.177  
The next World Bank indicator is government effectiveness. Government 
effectiveness refers to the quality of government and civil services as well as the level of 
their independence. The quality of government policy and the credibility of government 
commitment to its policy also fall under government effectiveness. Within the ANC, 
policy became consolidated under a few ANC heavyweights loyal to Mbeki. This policy 
from the centre provided little consultation with rank and file ANC members. Mbeki’s 
economic policy, the Growth, Employment and Reconstruction strategy (GEAR), was a 
good example of this. GEAR strongly encouraged market-driven action to improve 
growth through the private sector. This has proved contentious given that two ANC 
alliance members, SACP and COSATU, are leftist in ideology and have vehemently 
opposed GEAR. Due to the centralization of policy they had little say in the economic 
plan, despite being in the alliance. 
GEAR has been somewhat successful in improving South Africa’s economic 
position. Despite an economy left crumbling by the apartheid regime, GEAR did provide 
economic stability.178 Yet, it is difficult with high poverty rates to implement such a 
policy. Some have pointed out that GEAR was a good policy for South Africa, but 
without flexibility in the labour market it failed to create adequate growth.179 Regardless 
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of the effectiveness of GEAR, there were stark differences between what ANC 
membership wanted and what Mbeki forced through into law.  
The lack of oversight from parliament has contributed to the breakdown of policy 
formulation and implementation. The ANC’s majority in parliament assured that it 
controlled parliament’s performance and what it achieved. NEPAD’s assessment notes 
that parliament has been inconsistent at best in its role as seen in its handling of issues 
such as HIV/Aids and the Arms deal.180 With the amount of control exerted by Mbeki 
over parliament it was often limited to developing or amending legislation in areas which 
the executive had little interest.181 
Issues with the quality of policy have damaged the credibility of the ANC 
government’s commitment to policy that benefited South Africans. Evidence is mounting 
concerning policy which has brought the effectiveness of the ANC-led government into 
question. Economic policy issues such as GEAR and BEE have not improved the poverty 
situation in South Africa despite producing positive growth rates and a black capitalist 
class. Combined with the issues of Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Robert Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe the development of a tinderbox waiting to ignite was inevitable. As 
mentioned, in May 2008, xenophobic violence flared up across townships in South 
Africa. Rampant poverty combined with a mass influx of Zimbabwean nationals fleeing 
their own country’s economic crisis created unrest. The xenophobic violence may even 
be construed as anger over the ineffectiveness of Mbeki’s government. It was his 
government and administration which failed to deal with poverty and Zimbabwe on any 
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level. In fact, Mbeki declared soon after Zimbabwe’s election in March 2008 that there 
was in fact ‘no crisis’ in Zimbabwe,182 despite evidence proving otherwise. 
Other policy issues made Mbeki and the ANC less credible as well. The AIDS 
issue, which was alluded to previously, caused extreme delays in dealing with the 
disease. The insecure relationship between the security forces, namely the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) and the Scorpions, created an alarming turf war that will see the 
Scorpions anti-corruption force disbanded and brought under control of SAPS. Questions 
abound on why this has occurred given the Scorpions’ level of success, with some 
arguing that the ANC is ridding itself of the Scorpions because they are uncomfortable 
with their willingness to go after the ANC’s own. 
There is a connection between policy coming under control of Mbeki and his 
cronies and the quality of policy implemented by the ANC becoming less effective. This 
has, in turn, hurt the credibility of the government. The chief oversight body, parliament, 
designed to create a level of accountability failed to do so for a number of reasons. The 
Proportional Representation (PR) system causes MP’s to ally themselves more with their 
party which nominated them instead of protecting and fighting for citizen’s interests. The 
allegiance to the public does not affect their positions.183 This low interactivity with 
citizens allows for little accountability; an MP will not lose his or her job for towing the 
party line because voters do not have a direct connection with their MP. On the other 
hand an MP could risk his or her job if they stray from the party line even to defend the 
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interests of the public. The ANC often relies on party loyalty to prevent parliamentarians 
from carrying out oversight of the executive.184 
The quality of public services is a difficult issue for South Africa as it is for most 
African nations. South Africa’s problems stem partly from apartheid as most services 
were designed for only the white minorities needs. Therefore the difficulty lies in creating 
enough capacity to meet the entire population’s needs.185 Despite efforts to improve 
delivery of services, progress has been slow. NEPAD’s country review notes that the lack 
of capacity, experience, and responsiveness of civil servants has been central to the 
stunted progress in the delivery of services. One can point to healthcare, crime, and land 
redistribution amongst other sectors and issues where service delivery has hurt South 
Africa. The lack of delivery may also explain the xenophobic violence that gripped the 
nation in May 2008. 
One of the major reasons why service delivery has lagged behind is the quality of 
the civil service and its lack of capacity. Despite a commitment to improving the quality 
of the civil service the task is monumental and will take time to accomplish. Projects 
initiated by the central government to lend support to provincial and municipal 
governments to improve capacity have helped but could also lead to dependency on the 
national government, an issue already hindering good governance in other areas.186 
Another reason for the lack of skill within the public services may be found in the 
enforcement of BEE programmes in legislation. BEE legislation for private companies in 
South Africa has caused them to look towards the public sector for highly skilled 
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employees. By enticing public employees through large salary commitments, BEE laws 
are damaging the civil services ability to retain highly-skilled employees.187 
The fourth World Bank indicator is regulatory quality. This refers to the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulation that permit and 
promote the private sector. Much like political stability, regulatory quality is tracked by 
the World Bank on an upward trend. In 1996 South Africa occupied the 51.2 percentile 
but by 2006 the country had improved to the 70.2 percentile.188 The improvements in this 
area have been strong thanks to Mbeki’s economic action plan, GEAR. The commitment 
to GEAR surfaced as an issue in the run up to the leadership succession vote in December 
2007 because it had become such a point of division within the ANC.  
Rule of law is the fifth governance indicator and it refers to the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police and courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. 
According to the World Bank, South Africa has failed to make headway in improving 
this aspect of governance. In 1996 the World Bank ranked South Africa in the 60.5 
percentile and by 2006 the country was ranked 58.6.189 
The role of the courts has been a contentious issue during the ANC term in power. 
Under Mbeki the ANC proposed legislation which would allow him to nominate top 
judges and put court administration under the control of the Department of Justice.190 
Due to the outcry these bills were withdrawn. Yet, at the ANC conference in December 
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2007 the ANC voted again to transform the judiciary reportedly to make it more 
reflective of South African citizenry. This incarnation of judicial change is similar to 
original restructuring first proposed by Mbeki and has caused similar concern because it
would mean restructuring courts and their responsibilit
the 
 
ies.191 
                                                
The NEPAD assessment of South Africa clearly states the importance of rule of law 
and the necessity of an independent judiciary in promoting good governance.192 For 
South Africa the report acknowledges that its judiciary is independent and free from 
political pressure, but notes that apartheid’s legacy, when the judiciary was a tool of 
oppression, makes it difficult to deliver proper justice for much of the population. The 
assessment favours reforming the judiciary to reflect the South African population 
quickly but only if judges are appointed on merit alone.193 If not, there is the risk that 
those appointed could be beholden to those who chose them. The report also makes 
reference to the legislation proposed in reforming the judiciary as referred to above. The 
report notes that stakeholders fear that those reforms may threaten the judiciary’s 
independence.194 This harkens back to Mbeki’s penchant for centralizing control.  
Butler comments on the turbulent relationship between the ANC and the courts by 
noting that the ANC has become more critical of the bench’s apparent racist character 
and overwhelming white, male bench. This could mean that judicial authority will be a 
slow process to establish due to conflicts arising over politically motivated appointments 
in the future.195 
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As outlined in chapter three the police system in South Africa has struggled to 
fulfill its mandate. The South African Police Service (SAPS) have been criticized heavily 
over increasing crime rates. Added to SAPS problems is the looming takeover of the 
Scorpion anti-corruption force. Despite showing signs of progress in fulfilling its 
mandate to tackle corruption the Scorpions will be folded into SAPS, meaning one 
division of security service that is working will be dissolved and reformed under a 
structure that currently is struggling to fulfill its mandate The xenophobic violence which 
exploded in May 2008 exposed, in drastic fashion, the inability of SAPS to keep the rule 
of law. Overall, incompetence at the Safety and Security Ministry, corruption in the 
police force, and affirmative action has hurt capacity within SAPS, leading to its inability 
to provide a safe environment.196 
 The final governance indicator identified by the World Bank is control over 
corruption. This indicator refers to whether public power is exercised for private gain 
which includes both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as ‘capture’ of the state 
by elites and private interests. The World Bank’s research reflects tepid change in 
corruption levels in South Africa. In 1998 South Africa ranked in the 70.9 percentile, 
dipping to 67.5 in 2002 and back up to 70.9 percentile in 2006.197 A number of political 
figures close to Mbeki or under his leadership became embroiled in high profile 
corruption scandals, some of which the Scorpions investigated. Most notably, and 
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discussed in this paper, are the criminal activity surrounding Jacob Zuma and Jackie 
Selebi as well as the growing corruption within the bureaucracy.198 
 Mbeki controlled and centralized power which led to diminished accountability and 
corruption. The leadership succession brought to light how extensively Mbeki alienated 
the ANC grassroots supporters. The xenophobic violence highlighted how much his 
policy alienated large sectors of the country, specifically the poor. It was, after all, the 
poor who were promised the fruits of a free South Africa by the ANC and they have 
gained the least under Mbeki. 
As evidence has shown, Mbeki was inconsistent in implementing good governance 
principles especially when they obstructed him politically. I believe this has occurred 
because of an informalization of politics under the ANC’s watch. This is most evident in 
tracing Mbeki’s penchant for neo-patrimonial leadership when it suited him politically. 
South Africa’s experience may approach that of Zimbabwe when Robert Mugabe took 
over from the Ian Smith regime. Chabal and Daloz explain Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: 
“the post-colonial Africanization of the political system has brought a relatively 
rapid erosion of established bureaucratic norms. A large number of the new political 
elites, anxious to make good the disadvantages they suffered under the Smith 
regime; are today active participants in the informalization of politics.”199 
 
A similar situation may be developing in South Africa but under different circumstances. 
Due to the historical uniqueness of South Africa, it may not conform exactly as other 
African nations have, yet there are trends which are evident within South African 
political culture that echo neopatrimonialism as it has been identified elsewhere in Africa.  
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Neopatrimonialism in South Africa 
To identify neopatrimonialism in South Africa we again turn to Bratton and van de 
Walle’s three institutions: Presidentialism, clientelism, and state resources. The first 
theme, presidentialism, is seen in South Africa through the centralization of the ANC 
which led to the consolidated control of the party in the hands of Thabo Mbeki. There are 
two ways in which to consider this: the first is to ascribe the centralization and 
consolidation of the ANC to the modernization of the political system in South Africa. As 
Butler points out, for a mass party to obtain or hold on to power it must eventually 
control its rebel and dissident voices in order to have the appearance of unity. Essentially 
“…democracy that is deep (deliberative) and wide (participatory) undermines the 
organizational and political pre-requisites for party effectiveness. Parties are primarily 
instruments for securing state power, and they survive in competitive systems only 
through relatively rigorous organization to ensure effective recruitment, candidate choice, 
and campaigning.”200 Centralization of the ANC could be construed as encouraging in so 
much as it represents a maturing of the democratic process. Multiparty politics is a 
competition for power, and those parties that can attract the most votes by appealing to 
the widest spectrum of voters will hold on to power. With a wider base the party becomes 
home to multiple interests, which can represent a wider group of voters.  
The second way to view the centralization of the ANC is the consolidation of power 
in the presidency. As Chapter three suggests, Mbeki actively brought control of the party 
under himself in an effort to supervise and administer all aspects of the party’s direction 
and policy. Despite appearances that suggest a consolidation of the party system, it is 
more likely that Mbeki behaved like a big man in his actions to centralize the party. 
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Mbeki tended to hijacked apartheid-era ANC policies, used in the past to protect the 
ANC while an underground resistance movement, to gain control over all aspects of the 
ruling party in the post-apartheid era. 
The need to gain control of the party was probably a result of the shift from a 
Marxist-Leninist movement to fully fledged capitalist party. Some have stated that in 
order for a pact to be agreed upon by the National Party (NP) to end apartheid the ANC 
had to ensure its acceptance of a market economy with protection of property rights.201 
This would fall into line with the idea that Mbeki realized there was no choice for the 
ANC and went ahead with economic transformation through the GEAR program. Mbeki 
strove to control policy, local party branches, auxiliary structures, and parliament while 
ensuring consultation and dialogue were kept to a minimum in the ANC. In addition 
those who questioned the presidency were quickly silenced through coercive tactics. Thus 
a pattern emerged of a president eager to be involved in every decision, regardless of 
importance. As well, the willingness to use coercive steps to ensure power was retained 
by the presidency identifies a presidentialization of the ANC.  
These tactics of seeking to control all aspects of the party and ensuring mechanisms 
to maintain that control could explain how Mbeki hoped he could control the influential 
leftist contingent within the ANC.  In order to ensure the shift to capitalism within the 
ANC there would have had to be a plan to make sure the rank and file of the ANC would 
accept this change. Mbeki, therefore, simply took control of the party to ensure the 
acceptance by the ANC of a plan that may not have reflected the ANC’s membership’s 
ideological disposition. 
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In understanding Mbeki’s bid to control the ANC, the role of parliament is 
especially important. In order to develop into a successful party and implement plans 
such as GEAR, control needed to be centralized in order to maintain a singular message 
from the party. With many in the party wary of GEAR Mbeki needed to control all 
aspects of power in order to institute his economic vision. Parliament should have been at 
the forefront of holding the presidency to account but parliament failed numerous times 
to do so. A distinctive sign of neo-patrimonial rule is the curbing of parliamentary 
structures in African nations. In South Africa this has been no different. The Arms Deal 
has become a classic example of parliament relenting on its duty in the face of a powerful 
presidency. As referred to previously, Andrew Feinstein actively attempted to uncover 
this massive corruption scandal but was silenced through coercion and eventually was 
replaced as the ANC representative on SCOPA, the committee investigating the deal. The 
remaining ANC MP’s took control of the committee in order to shut down any 
investigation into the ANC involvement in the deal. The strong majority which the ANC 
possesses in parliament meant the curbing of internal democracy of the ANC which in 
turn affected governance on a whole in South Africa.  
There are obvious traits that Mbeki displayed while in power which fall into line 
under Bratton and van de Walle’s concept of presidentialism. Despite this, he does not 
fulfill all dimensions of presidentialism such as promoting a cult of personality around 
himself or attempting to model himself as a father figure of the country. Yet, as we have 
seen there are strong examples which attest to aspects of ‘big man’ democracy that are 
emerging.  
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Clientelism could also be identified in South Africa under Mbeki. Clientelistic 
practices by Mbeki to solidify his presidency came chiefly through installing his loyalists 
into key positions and the black economic empowerment (BEE) programs. In appointing 
loyalists to all departments and areas of government (regardless of merit or skill) Mbeki 
was able to gain control of expansive areas of government. In return, many of those he 
appointed owed their position (and its perks) to Mbeki himself. This can produce an 
obligation to confer with him frequently on decisions, and produce poor results in return 
due to micromanagement. An example has been the AIDS issue where various cabinet 
ministers, including the health minister Dr. Manto Tshabalala-Msinmang, an Mbeki 
crony, failed to question the president’s skepticism over the connection between HIV and 
AIDS. The outcome proved disastrous; a late start on the production of anti-retrovirals 
which caused South Africa to be embarrassingly late to deal with the epidemic.202 This 
was also the same minister who claimed garlic and beetroot would defend the body from 
the HIV virus. 
Parliament is another example of the growing clientelism within the governing 
ANC. The proportional representation system was taken advantage of by Mbeki to 
control who sat in parliament. As the electoral lists are chosen by the presidency, those 
who were selected became beholden to the presidency. The opposite is also true; those 
who disagreed with Mbeki found their names stricken from the list. Parliamentarians 
therefore had to be careful with their criticism because to be seen taking an opinion 
opposite the official ANC line could cause the loss of an influential patronage position.  
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Loyalists who were given parastatal positions, placed on parliamentarian lists, or 
hired to coveted jobs within the government took advantage of their positions of power in 
the ANC under Mbeki. The ‘gate’ scandals, Jackie Selebi, Jacob Zuma, and the Arms 
Deal all bear witness to ANC political elite abusing the positions they were voted to or 
appointed to. The ‘gate’ scandals specifically speak to the ‘perks’ and rents that those in 
the ANC felt were available to them because of the positions they held. The conclusion of 
the travel gate scandal saw the liquidators of the parliamentarians travel debts told to no 
longer pursue any action to reimburse what was stolen. 203  
BEE has caused a flood of ANC elites to move seamlessly into the private sector. 
They have been able to secure control of large companies or become black fronts for 
white-dominated companies in various sectors in order to fulfill government mandated 
quotients. Mbeki had sought to create a black middle class, on the example of Malaysia, 
which would be beholden to the ANC.204 Although an important goal the motives behind 
creating a black capitalist class restricted its effectiveness in solidifying democracy due to 
the role Mbeki and ANC wanted it to play in nation building. The ANC and Mbeki hoped 
BEE would legitimize their regime because a black capitalist class would buffer it against 
an impatient black majority as well as obtain economic power that would rival their white 
counterparts in the economy.205 Therefore ‘patriotic’ blacks were shuttled off to 
important, visible sectors of the economy where white’s dominated (mining, energy, 
petroleum, media and telecommunications, financial services, and government 
procurement contracts) via BEE. As Mbeki’s brother Moeletsi Mbeki, a deputy 
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chairperson of the SA Institute of International Relations at the University of 
Witwatersrand, has pointed out the BEE process has stagnated due to nepotism and the 
transfer of assets to those with political connections in the ANC.206  
Democracy needs a strong middle class that identify their economic independence 
from the state and begin to hold government accountable. Due to the coercive nature of 
the ANC with regards to government-business relations – forcing black business leaders 
to be the support structure of the regime – a very different outcome has emerged from 
BEE: 
“The absence of instrumental-rational, class-conscious institutions’ has, 
however, made direct personal connections to state officials and the party 
hierarchy the preferred route to continued accumulation. Corruption and 
fronting for white capital have become endemic to the BEE process that 
has begun to acquire neo-patrimonial characteristics as government 
departments and agencies have yet to develop the capacity to monitor 
compliance.”207 
 
The idea behind BEE is sound as the redistribution of assets to de-racialize the South 
African economy was needed. Yet the ANC has attempted to use the black middle-class 
to protect itself from the poor black majority and white economic power. The ANC 
Mbeki-ites, it would seem, created a network of clients to retain power. 
With only a few gaining, the vast rank and file of the ANC, who were promised the 
fruits of freedom, have received next to nothing. Their lot in life has not improved at all: 
unemployment rates remain the same, service delivery is still slow and halting, and the 
ANC seemingly has done nothing to change this. The support networks which brought 
the ANC to power, the poor black majority, were neglected.  
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The third institution highlighted by Bratton and van de Walle is the use state 
resources. The use of state resources by Thabo Mbeki has been quite widespread and 
based mostly upon using the power of the state to coerce and manipulate in order to fulfill 
his goals. This is most evident in the ‘assassination plot’, his protection of police 
commissioner Jackie Selebi, and his attempts to sideline Jacob Zuma. Mbeki’s use of the 
state to manipulate and control opponents and protect friends has been some of the most 
explicit evidence of patrimonial logic in his term in office. The use of state resources 
revealed a president who believed he was above the law.  
 In the assassination plot, the revelation of three prominent leadership opponents 
plotting to oust Mbeki from office allowed Mbeki to conveniently push these political 
rivals out of politics in 2001 despite scant evidence of such a plan.208 As well, by 2001 
Mbeki had fallen out with Jacob Zuma when it emerged that Zuma was considered a 
successor to Mbeki due to the president’s failures in Zimbabwe and AIDS. When 
corruption charges emerged in connection with Zuma during 2005 it gave Mbeki a reason 
to sideline Zuma.209 What makes the Zuma firing questionable is Mbeki’s continual 
protection of Jackie Selebi. Selebi, a close confidant of Mbeki’s, was not fired as Police 
Commissioner despite damaging evidence that connected Selebi to criminal groups 
related to Brett Kebble’s murder. In fact, in late June 2008, Mbeki decided to extend 
Selebi’s contract for another year despite pending charges of corruption.210 If Mbeki 
wanted to rid the government of corruption by sending a message that no one was safe - 
seen in the firing of Zuma - his protection of Selebi provided a very inconsistent message. 
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Instead of setting a strong precedent against corruption Mbeki came across as trying to 
protect friends and remove rivals. 
The more traditional use of state resources in patrimonial regimes, the handing out 
of state funds to obtain electoral support, can be seen in the arms deal and Chancellor 
House deals. The Arms deal saga continues to unfold and reveal a murky picture in which 
numerous ANC figures gained significantly. The extent to which ANC leaders have gone 
to cover up or stunt any attempt at investigating the deal raises further questions on the 
likelihood of corruption.  
 Chancellor House is specifically at risk to corruption due to its role as ANC 
investment arm. As long as the ANC is in power Chancellor House will conceivably 
provide inside access to state resources. It has become an easy means for dispensing state 
resources through channels that can appear legitimate and harmless. Importantly, 
Chancellor House provided cover for government and business because the ANC 
government is no longer seen handing out state resources directly for political gain. The 
power deals with Eskom highlight this well. Eskom fell into trouble because its coal 
buying procedures were altered to favour small, BEE-related coal suppliers. The 
inefficiency this created caused Eskom’s reserves to drop disastrously low. Due to 
mismanagement Eskom had to look for new projects to increase power production as 
South Africa fell deeper into a power crisis. The urgency the crisis created allowed 
Chancellor House to step in and obtain large contracts from Eskom. The ruling party’s 
funding arm receiving black empowerment contracts from a state-owned corporation will 
create substantial patronage opportunities.  
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Interestingly it even seems the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) has followed in its 
parent organization’s footsteps by creating its own big men. At the ANCYL national 
Conference in 2008 the conspicuous show of expensive cars chauffeuring the Youth 
leaders to the conference was in sharp contrast to the general membership who arrived 
aboard buses. Controversy erupted over how the league’s leaders attained money for such 
expenditures. Membership in the Youth League has become popular not only as an 
entrance to politics, but also as a fast track to riches. The fact that the Youth League has 
its own financial arm, Lembede, may provide an explanation for its popularity. 211 
The Youth League example provides overt evidence that ‘big man democracy’ is 
emerging in South Africa. The idea that the Youth League is no longer a place where 
young ANC members are brought into the party to train and become the leaders of 
tomorrow paints a troubling picture of the ANC. No longer an educational institution for 
the ANC, the Youth League has become attractive to young people because it provides 
the opportunity to access wealth quickly. Indeed, the Youth League provides an example 
of what politics has become in South Africa, a pathway to state resources. As the ANC 
dominates the political landscape and continues to be the singular avenue to personal 
success, the growth of neopatrimonialism will not be far behind. The party and the 
political offices it holds no longer are there for the advancement of the ANC and its 
members’ goals, bur rather as their own personal wealth generators.  
In analyzing the extent of neopatrimonialism in South Africa I would like to refer 
back to Bratton and van de Walle’s modal regimes. Under apartheid South Africa would 
be considered a settler regime. Accordingly South Africa, after transforming into a 
                                                 
211  Nosimilo Ndlovu and Niren Tolsi, "Bling on the ANC Ivy League," Mail and Guardian Online, July 6, 
2008. http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-07-06-bling-on-the-anc-ivy-league (accessed July 10, 2008). 
 73
multiparty system, should have a good chance to be a successful democracy. The 
Mandela years provided strong indication that this would be true due to the introduction 
of a strong constitution, the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
and the role of Mandela himself. Yet, under Mbeki good governance was shelved in 
favour of patrimonial logic. There are strong traces of presidentialism, clientalism and 
use of state resources which provide evidence of neopatrimonialism. For Bratton and van 
de Walle, these incidences identify that the country is backsliding from its democratic 
freedoms. This suggests that African countries are either progressing towards democracy 
or they are reversing course towards authoritarianism. In the case of South Africa, under 
Mbeki, the country may have experienced a challenge to its progression towards Western 
style democracy or it is regressing from its democratic high water mark due to various 
failures, some of which are outlined in this thesis. Yet, if it is true that a country is 
progressing towards Western democracy with problems along the way, or is permanently 
regressing due to problems such as an authoritarian leader, does this provide enough 
explanation for similar failures throughout the African continent? It would be difficult to 
argue that Africa, as a continent, has been so afflicted simply due to circumstance. 
Chabal and Daloz offer a differing explanation which argues that it is not a question of 
whether African nations are progressing or regressing from Western style democracy, but 
rather issues such as neopatrimonialism should be expected given the various 
circumstances in Africa that are not present in Western democracies.  
It is clear South Africa is showing increasing signs of patrimonial logic at the 
expense of good government. The bureaucracy, which Chabal and Daloz explain is so 
important to modernization, is failing to show signs of emancipation from the state, as 
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corruption is at apartheid levels or worse with evidence mounting that bureaucratic 
positions are increasingly used for patronage.212 The question then is why governance 
gains from the democratic transition have so quickly dissipated. Chabal and Daloz argue 
that the informalization of politics is the desired state of Africa’s political elite meaning it 
may be desirable to attain a less institutionalized state because it meshes better with the 
relationship between the political elite (patrons) and the ANC rank and file (clients). 
Thabo Mbeki, in a quest to develop an entirely new power base for the ANC, had to 
break away from the ANC’s traditional and historical power base – the majority black 
and poor who reside on the political left. Patrimonial logic underlies the BEE program as 
the ANC’s hegemonic tendencies have stunted the rise of a strong capitalist class.213  
Mbeki therefore may have understood that patrimonial logic continues to operate in 
South Africa and used it to develop his own power base. He recognized the necessity to 
shift the ANC to a market-friendly platform due to external influences such as a pact with 
the National Party and global economic pressure and thus used patrimonial power to 
perform this major change in the ANC. The reality that patrimonial logic is present in 
South African politics may explain more properly why many in the ANC elite have 
followed a more informalized style of politics.   
The informalization of politics raises the possibility that Mbeki has constructed a 
big-man democracy in South Africa. For Mbeki, who lived for years in exile abroad 
during apartheid, there are other complex issues at stake which may shed light on his 
behavior regarding patrimonialism. As expressed at the start of this chapter, it was Mbeki 
who was the democrat and Mandela who tended to a more imperial tone in leadership 
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which meant that Mbeki did want to, in some ways, implement good governance. But the 
problems that Mbeki has failed to deal with such as AIDS and Zimbabwe often were 
initiated from his complex and sometimes mystifying views on issues like race and 
Africanism. Therefore it may not be fair to state that Mbeki has introduced 
neopatrimonialism solely because of a desire to become a big man. Indeed his secretive 
style of leadership provided fertile ground for neo-patrimonial logic, but the complexity 
of the former president reveals that some of the damage his leadership inflicted on the 
country may be poor leadership in a general sense. Regardless, his leadership provided 
room for neopatrimonialism to germinate in South Africa. Thus, Mbeki’s true impact on 
South Africa will be that he opened the door to neopatrimonialism in South Africa. 
Beyond Thabo Mbeki 
Mbeki’s authoritarian style, centralized control, protection of cronies, and attempts 
at running for a third term as ANC president have also paved the way for Jacob Zuma. 
Zuma became the symbol for everything and everyone Mbeki rejected. He is personable, 
a ‘man of the people,’ Zulu, leftist, not formally educated, and a ‘self made man.’ He has 
spoken out against Robert Mugabe whom Mbeki steadfastly refused to condemn. The 
leftist contingent in the ANC, so shunned by Mbeki, has backed Zuma completely. Since 
Zuma’s rise to power, his loyalists have taken control of the majority of ANC posts once 
held by Mbeki supporters. 
Jacob Zuma, it seems, will be beholden to the left once in power which illustrates 
how Mbeki’s term in the presidency has left room clientelism and patrimonial logic to 
expand. Mbeki rejected traditional clientelistic bonds and was dismissed as ANC leader. 
By Mbeki so abruptly turning his back on the rank and file, politics in South Africa 
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became a zero-sum game. Now political power in South Africa will likely depend on who 
can establish the most networks. The need and desire to be in charge politically has 
become of utmost importance because of the access to resource it entails. 
This may explain how Zuma has become the president of the ANC. With little 
formal education, having twice been charged with corruption– which was essentially 
proven in the Shaik corruption trial- and having been charged with rape he still easily 
defeated Mbeki for the presidency of the ANC in December 2007 and took control of the 
larger networks within the ANC. Clients will inevitably migrate to those patrons who 
they see as being most able to dispense state resources. Zuma has gathered support 
(clients) from the overlooked left in the ANC which propelled him to power.  
The rivalry between Mbeki and Zuma also highlighted the uniqueness of 
neopatrimonialism in South Africa. Despite the fact that Mbeki is Xhosa and Zuma is 
Zulu, rarely has the tension between them been ethnic in nature. Some in the Zulu camp 
have brought up ethnicity as the reason for Zuma’s firing yet ethnicity has, for the most 
part, stayed out of the leadership battle and drive for resources. The ANC has done well 
to avoid ethnic tension over its history which has probably dampened the ethnic trouble 
so far within the party.  Instead, neopatrimonialism exists along class lines within the 
black majority in South Africa, namely between the poor black and the black bourgeoisie.  
Numerous calls for a compromise candidate were heard in the December 2007 
leadership conference for the ANC. With a stable of younger, capable leaders waiting in 
the wings the elder Zuma was still the most preferred candidate for leadership in 
opposition to Mbeki. As Chabal and Daloz stated, legitimacy comes from how well your 
clientele is nourished and Zuma has promised much to the left which makes access to 
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governmental resources paramount for him. Zuma owes much to the leftist contingent in 
his party when he comes to power and will face tough decisions when those resources are 
available to him. 
A number of challenges still stand in Jacob Zuma’s journey to the presidency of 
South Africa. As Mbeki was pushed further aside to lame-duck status Zuma appeared to 
gain more control and power within the ANC. It has been a troublesome journey for 
Zuma as he is beset by corruption allegations and an angry leftist contingent which has 
backed him completely. If he does not fulfill the promises made to the left, he may 
experience more trouble than Mbeki as the left has staked its future to Zuma. 
Jacob Zuma has said and done all the correct things to placate those who worry over 
the direction South Africa will take under his leadership. Fortunately for him, the 
poisoned political atmosphere that Mbeki created has allowed Zuma to receive the benefit 
of the doubt from many critics and citizens. The Zuma era will be the most important 
presidency to date in South Africa due to the shortcomings of Mbeki’s term. 
Encouragingly, Jacob Zuma represents a second leadership change for South Africa since 
the end of apartheid. 
Jacob Zuma’s troubles though are South Africa’s troubles and his issues will 
challenge governance in South Africa as much as Mbeki’s did. First, the issue regarding 
his corruption charges must be resolved. Zuma and his team had developed a plan to have 
his case thrown out or delayed until he reaches office. He has since had the charges 
dropped through a controversial court decision but that has not cleared him of the 
charges. Recently the courts have allowed prosecutors to charge him again if they deem 
fit. A delaying tactic would allow him, when in office, to amend the constitution to 
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protect a current president from prosecution.214 Most in the Zuma camp feel that he has 
been unfairly attacked by Mbeki by way of the Scorpion anti-corruption force which to 
them justifies the push to skirt the corruption charges regardless of the tenuous legality of 
such a maneuver. Zuma supporters insist on this so much that after Zuma and his loyalists 
took control of the ANC they immediately moved to place the Scorpions under control of 
the SAPS.215 
Zuma supporters have stood militantly behind him in his quest to escape his 
corruption trial. Julius Malema, president of the ANCYL, has said he is ready to kill to 
prevent Zuma’s trial.216 Cosatu’s general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi also reiterated this 
sentiment. This attitude towards Zuma concurred with a report which suggests that many 
in the ANC believe it is more important that Zuma become president than follow the 
Constitution and its provisions.217 
Added to Zuma’s legal woes is the case of Western Cape Judge John Hlophe who 
was accused by the Constitutional Court of trying to solicit two of its own judges to 
favour Zuma in his corruption trial.218 Hlophe allegedly approached two judges with a 
‘mandate’ in Zuma’s favour. Hlophe is accused of relaying to those judges knowledge of 
people who would lose their jobs after the election.219 Zuma has denied any connection to 
Hlophe but the situation did prove volatile. 
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The most important test for good governance and the growth of neopatrimonialism 
in South Africa with regards to Zuma is how he will placate the left in the ANC. Since 
his victory in December 2007 he has taken great pains to calm the fears of businesses’ 
and investors by claiming that he will not introduce major monetary or fiscal policy 
changes.220 After these attempts by Zuma to woo business leaders his popularity dipped 
precipitously, a mere six months from his election to the top ANC job.221 With his 
victory over Mbeki and subsequent dip in the polls, the left has proven its strength with
the ANC. It remains to be seen if Zuma would dare not shift ANC policy to the lef
in 
t.  
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workers.”224 
                                                
As the general election approached in 2009, Cosatu took a strong approach to its 
role in the ANC. General-Secretary Vavi of Cosatu identified the election of Zuma as 
“usher[ing] in a new situation.”222 Vavi has made it know he expects a shift to the left as 
“…Post-Polokwane is about reversal.”223 Cosatu’s president echoed this sentiment 
stating unequivocally that the “ANC must be on the forefront when the masses are risin
We expect the ANC to sit down and talk to us. We expect the leadership we have 
campaigned for in Polokwane to sit down with us. This is why Cosatu worked so hard to 
ensure [that] the leadership of the ANC is strongly biased towards the 
Zuma has promised all things to all sides which inevitably will leave someone 
disappointed. If he continues Mbeki’s policy the left will be angered and he will lose the 
support networks that brought him to power. It will reassure the markets and business 
leaders but surely that confidence would quickly erode should Cosatu attempt to 
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destabilize the work force with strikes and other tactics. Cosatu president Dlamini had 
already attacked Mbeki’s finance minister with such tactics: “You too [Manuel], if you 
do not listen to the voices of the poor, war unto you,”225 Additionally, if Zuma continues 
Mbeki’s policy the issues surrounding BEE will persist, only with Zuma controlling 
which clients receive state funding. Eventually, this will further destabilize the market, 
causing more investors to flee. 
If Zuma decides to placate the left and shift ANC policy in that direction he stands 
to completely frighten already shaken investors and destabilize businesses in South 
Africa. He will have satisfied his base by bringing into his fold many on the left who 
have been shut off from access to key state resources. This would mirror post-Ian Smith 
Zimbabwe. This may be a worst-case scenario but given the growing militancy of the left 
in the ANC it should not be ruled out. With the expectation of Zuma becoming president 
many diverted their attention away from ANC priorities toward patronage possibilities 
that await those who backed Zuma. Thus need and desire to see the consolidation of 
democracy and good governance principles continues to ebb away.226 This should not 
come as a surprise, despite the left’s constant criticism of Mbeki’s closed, autocratic 
leadership the real complaint of the left in the ANC may be that it has been denied access 
to state resources and patronage opportunities. With Jacob Zuma assuming power the 
drive by those who brought him there to seek the reward for their support is growing, 
with good governance losing traction. Referring back to Chabal and Daloz, if South 
Africa is held up to the tenets of good governance it will undoubtedly fail to pass the 
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grade because development (code for modernization) in contemporary Africa will not 
“…fit with the western experience of development.”227 
It is difficult to blame Mbeki wholly for the situation South Africa finds itself in. If 
South Africa is held up to the tenets of good governance it is bound to fail because good 
governance as a theory does not necessarily apply to the political reality in Africa. For 
example, the perception of the individual in Africa should not be conceptualized as a 
citizen acting as an individual agent for personal gain, which is a key foundation for good 
governance. Rather it is important to conceive of individuals only within a wider 
community in Africa.228 This renders the application of good governance based on 
western ideals difficult at best. In addition Chabal and Daloz point out that Bratton and 
van de Walle’s theory also relies upon defining individuals as citizens which disregards 
the socio-economic environment.229 This means the thought that Africa will consolidate 
along democratic lines or at least be in the process of transitioning to democracy as the 
West conceives is troublesome at best. Chabal and Daloz explain further: 
“In our view, multi-party elections are unlikely to bring about significant 
change in the nature of individual differentiation in the present context of 
social, economic, and political disorder. We would be thus wary of any 
suggestion that such transitions might usher in a fundamental mutation in 
the contemporary political order. The experience of South Africa where, 
uniquely on the continent, Western and African notions of identity both 
have deep historical roots, will be an interesting test case of the extent to 
which Western-style democracy evolves in Africa.”230 
 
Indeed, with both notions deeply imbedded in South Africa this, possibly, is why Mbeki 
used patrimonial logic to introduce Western style democracy and good governance. After 
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years of Western political identity dominating the social sphere, the African identity has 
begun to assert itself, drawing two identity concepts into close contact which is producing 
a uniquely South African political landscape. 
Conclusion 
South Africa possesses many traits of emerging neopatrimonialism which it 
developed under Thabo Mbeki and could continue under Jacob Zuma. This emerging 
neopatrimonialism is not a reversal of democratic development as Bratton and Van de 
Walle argue, rather it is the development of a political functionality that works best for 
those who have the most at stake, South African citizens. Therefore if Mandela was the 
zenith of African leadership and the mold to which all African leaders should be held up 
to then Mbeki may have tainted his legacy. Yet, if Mandela is the model leader because 
he seems to fit the western ideals of a leader then it may be prudent to revisit the model 
of good governance in Africa. What good is the governance model if it does not function 
properly in African culture? Thabo Mbeki’s term in office may have brought 
neopatrimonialism into South African politics, but it is important to bear in mind that 
neo-patrimonial ideals may fulfill African political needs more directly and efficiently 
then good governance anyway. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
One of the most telling incidents in South Africa which offers a small example of 
the political environment which emerged from the Thabo Mbeki era is the state of 
disrepair that Robben Island has found itself in. The island, made famous as the jail 
which housed Nelson Mandela during apartheid, has since become a living memorial 
which vividly portrays the extreme brutality of apartheid. The site is visited by thousands, 
becoming a popular tourist destination in Cape Town. In fact, the location has been 
deemed a World Heritage Site due to its importance.  
Despite the importance of the island, prison, and museum the site has been severely 
mishandled in recent years due to gross financial mismanagement. At every point there 
has been complete incompetence, fraud, and theft of the island’s resources and revenue 
by its management.231 For example an audit found that executive management’s salaries 
increased by 259% between 2004 and 2007.232 As well, an unbelievable number of 
financial irregularities bankrupted the tourist site, as a result of management treating the 
island “…like their own private ATM.”233 
What makes the Robben Island situation a small example of South Africa under the 
ANC is how the party responded to the incident. The Minister of Arts and Culture, Pallo 
Jordan, recommended that the management team at fault be allowed to resign quietly in 
order to avoid embarrassment. Jordan stated in a letter: 
“It’s deemed prudent that the council pass a resolution to approve the final 
report and charges and further that the CEO, COO, and CFO be given the 
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option to resign with immediate effect in lieu of being charged and facing 
a disciplinary hearing, on conclusion of which the likely sanction would 
be dismissal.”234 
 
The ANC’s response to the neglect shown Robben Island highlights the larger state of the 
ANC. The criminal act was not the immediate concern; rather it is the perception of the 
party that was so important as well as the protection of ANC loyalists appointed to the 
island’s management. 
What Robben Island signifies, and the way the ANC wanted to handle it, highlights 
well the volatile political scene in South Africa. Incidents such as these provide glimpses 
of the changing attitudes around governance. Interestingly the management team was still 
charged despite a desire by the ANC to handle the matter quietly. This brings together the 
competing nature of politics where two ideals of governance and leadership intersect, on 
the one side the ANC and neopatrimonialism and the other, good governance. 
The one indelible mark Thabo Mbeki made during his leadership was the 
informalization of politics in South Africa. Yet, whether Mbeki saw himself as a big man 
is difficult to say. A democratizing figure under Mandela he quickly centralized control, 
muzzled criticism, and displayed decidedly autocratic behavior once gaining the 
presidency. The question remains, were his autocratic tendencies due to the increasing 
influence of neopatrimonialism in South Africa? I would argue that it was the influence 
of neopatrimonialism that has driven Mbeki in this direction; that being said, there are 
other factors that have no doubt also affected Mbeki and the ANC.  
This thesis does not begin to defend Mbeki’s term in office, yet it does identify key 
signs that point to neopatrimonialism which may explain some of Mbeki’s perceived 
errors in leadership. The failures during Mbeki’s term in office may be partially blamed 
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upon an inevitable tide of neopatrimonialism which has been attributed in other African 
nations to have weakened good governance. South Africa is considered important to the 
West, a country in Africa with relatively strong democratic roots, civil society, and 
judiciary which makes it a model for others on the continent. It has the strongest capacity 
for good governance in Africa; it possesses a strong historical inheritance built upon the 
legacy of Nelson Mandela, and yet the country appears to have stagnated in terms of 
political development.  
There are two points which may provide answers to some of the problems identified 
in this thesis. Some have been alluded to in passing already but they bear repeating. The 
first is the ANC’s history as a revolutionary liberation movement. As a Marxist 
underground freedom movement the ANC had a number of organizational aspects which 
have influenced the current party. For example, the ANC has maintained its top down 
authoritarian leadership structure, internal criticism is frowned upon, and self-promotion 
and campaigning are considered foreign to the movement – as this would put the interests 
of the individual ahead of the party. These features have carried over despite its transition 
to a market-friendly, democratic party. As detailed previously, these apartheid era tactics 
have flourished in today’s ANC to help party leaders tighten their hold on the party and 
its direction. As well, the liberation movement often convinces the party going forward 
that it has a god-given right to lead, regardless of elections or popularity. 
The second point is the fact that the ANC is the dominant party in a multiparty 
system. Similar to other African nations such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Botswana, 
South Africa has only known one party in power. There is a deep connection between 
former liberation movements and the dominant party after independence. The importance 
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of the dominant party aspect is that the future of the country rests with the ANC. This 
means the future of South Africa is therefore subject to the idiosyncrasies of the ANC. 
The ANC’s more autocratic traits therefore affect the country as a whole. 
These two themes have played an important role in South Africa and will be 
important in the future of the country. These features, though not root causes, have 
facilitated a further informalization of politics. As a dominant party the ANC does not 
have the incentive to follow good governance. With neo-patrimonial concepts prevalent 
and democratic institutions failing to provide accountability, coupled with a dominant 
party with a growing desire to centralize control, the situation South Africa is now in 
should not be surprising. 
Looking towards the future it is difficult with any certainty to predict what will 
happen in South Africa. The future of the country is now firmly in the hands of Jacob 
Zuma. Prior to the 2009 election, which Jacob Zuma won handily, his corruption charges 
were again thrown out but the allegations of corruption will continue to follow him 
throughout his presidency. As well, how the looming stand-off between the Zuma-led 
ANC and the judiciary will offer a glimpse of where South Africa is headed. Mbeki 
flirted with changing the judiciary but never was able to fully bring the judiciary under 
ANC control. With the immense pressure now put on the courts with the full force of the 
Zuma-led ANC the results will bear watching. 
Looking at the long-term picture of South Africa, questions must be raised over the 
viability of good governance in the country. Watching a country such as South Africa 
gradually move away from good governance practices can be disconcerting but if there is 
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a realization that the long term viability of Western solutions for African problems may 
be in question, history may prove kinder to South African then other African nations.  
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